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INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
CORPORATE CRIME 
Gregory M. Gilchrist 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate crime is too often addressed by fining the corporation, 
leaving the real people who committed the crime facing no 
consequence at all. This failure to hold individuals accountable in 
cases of corporate malfeasance generates an accountability gap that 
undermines deterrence and introduces expressive costs. Facing 
heightened criticism of this trend, then-Deputy Attorney General 
Sally Yates issued a policy designed to generate prosecutions of real 
people in cases of corporate wrongdoing. The policy reflects a strong 
and continuing demand for more prosecutions of individuals in the 
corporate context. 
This Article contends that the effort to introduce accountability by 
increasing prosecutions against individuals, while understandable and 
responsive to a real problem, is bound to fail in two distinct ways. 
First, it will fail as a procedural matter by systematically punishing 
lower-level corporate employees. Second, it will fail as a normative 
matter by systematically punishing based on overbroad and unclear 
laws. 
Identifying these procedural and normative failings lends new 
clarity to the nature of the accountability gap. The popular anger 
toward corporate management is often predicated on blame for 
recklessness and greed, rather than blame for violating positive law. 
As such, the anger is neither irrational nor inconsequential; however, 
it is directed toward a kind of culpability that is a poor fit for criminal 
law. The accountability gap must be addressed, but in most instances 
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of corporate misconduct, civil liability represents the best mechanism 
for holding people accountable. 
INTRODUCTION 
The last decade brought repeated and frequent bad news from the 
world’s greatest, most powerful, and most revered corporations. 
Stories of abuse, misconduct, and crime within these elite and 
critically important institutions greet us on a near-daily basis. The 
legal system does a poor job governing corporate conduct. It ought to 
do better. 
That there is too much corporate crime is not news. The question 
remains how to address it. Some degree of fraud was almost surely 
an element of the financial crisis;1 in the years since, banks have paid 
staggering fines,2 but senior bankers have been neither jailed nor 
even prosecuted.3 This trend extends beyond the financial crisis to 
financial institutions more generally. A global bank systematically 
failed to prevent money laundering by narco-terrorist organizations,4 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 15–16 (2011) 
(describing various frauds that contributed to the financial crisis). There is important disagreement about 
whether prosecutors had or could have generated evidence of specific frauds necessary to support 
prosecutions. Compare Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-
crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (expressing skepticism about government claims that there may 
have been no fraud), with Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 
268 (2014) (noting that the macro-level conclusions of the Financial Inquiry Commission bear little 
relation to the sorts of specific evidence needed to support specific charges). The point here is smaller 
and entirely macro: fraudulent conduct in the financial sector almost certainly contributed to the crisis. 
See generally MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE 
DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET xi (2017). 
 2. See Christina Rexrode & Emily Glazer, Big Banks Paid $110 Billion in Mortgage-Related Fines. 
Where Did the Money Go?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2016, 4:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-
banks-paid-110-billion-mortgage-related-fines-where-did-the-money-go-1457557442 (reviewing fines 
totaling $110 billion paid by Bank of America Corp., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Wells 
Fargo & Co., Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. “for their role in inflating a mortgage 
bubble that helped cause the financial crisis”). 
 3. Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial Crisis 
Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 168 (2015); RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, supra note 1, at 1. 
 4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit 
to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Press Release], 
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pharmaceutical companies marketed products for purposes 
unapproved by the FDA,5 and an auto manufacturer concealed a 
safety defect from regulators that allegedly contributed to 124 
deaths.6 In each case, the entity paid headline-generating fines, while 
the real people involved in the misconduct were not prosecuted.7 
People, not companies, commit crimes, but more often than not, 
companies, not people, pay the price. 
This emphasis on entity-level liability is problematic. Although 
there are good reasons to hold organizations qua organizations 
accountable, doing so is insufficient as a matter of deterrence and 
expressive justice. And the failure to hold bad actors accountable has 
not gone unnoticed; indeed, some have even pointed to the failure to 
prosecute individuals in the wake of the financial crisis as a factor in 
the recent shift toward populism among the electorate.8 
Entity-level criminal liability is an unusual and unwieldy 
construct. An organization violates an external norm when, and only 
when,9 one or more of its agents violates that norm.10 Criticisms of 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1478.html. 
 5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to 
Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, GlaxoSmithKline Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-
and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report. 
 6. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges 
Against General Motors and Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $900 Million Forfeiture (Sept. 17, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-criminal-charges-
against-general-motors-and-deferred [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice, General Motors Press Release]; 
see also Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Engine Switch Case, CORP. CRIME REP. 
(Sept. 17, 2015, 10:53 AM), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/critics-rip-gm-deferred-
prosecution-in-switch-case/. 
 7. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline Press Release, supra note 5; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
HSBC Press Release, supra note 4; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, General Motors Press Release, supra note 6. 
 8. See Gretchen Morgenson, How Letting Bankers Off the Hook May Have Tipped the Election, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/business/how-letting-bankers-off-
the-hook-may-have-tipped-the-election.html (“There are many facets to the populist, anti-establishment 
anger that swept Donald J. Trump into the White House in Tuesday’s election. A crucial element fueling 
the rage, in my view, was this: Not one high-ranking executive at a major financial firm was held to 
account for the crisis of 2008.”); see also Ryan Cooper, 2009: The Year the Democratic Party Died, 
THE WEEK (Nov. 15, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/661871/2009-year-democratic-party-died. 
 9. In some circuits there can be minor exceptions to this statement because of the collective 
knowledge doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 10. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (“Applying the 
principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that the act of the agent, while 
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applying criminal law to entities are manifold, but the simplest 
critique is that entity-level liability punishes the wrong people: the 
pain of the penalty is visited primarily on innocent parties, such as 
shareholders.11 The real people who committed the wrong generally 
remain unpunished.12 This accountability gap undermines retributive 
justice and general deterrence.13 Moreover, expressively, the public is 
left with the devastating impression that elites are immune from 
punishment.14 
The dominant response has been a call, both formal and informal, 
to more aggressively prosecute the individuals involved with 
corporate malfeasance. The Yates Memo represents a formal iteration 
of this response; it alters certain policies governing prosecutorial 
discretion in an effort to generate more individual criminal 
prosecutions.15 The specifics of the Yates Memo are a response to the 
demand that the legal system do more to hold individuals 
accountable.16 Yates, of course, is no longer with the Department of 
Justice (DOJ),17 and the status of any prosecutorial policy is subject 
to change. This issue, however, is not going away.18 The urgency of 
                                                                                                                 
exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the 
interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the 
corporation for which he is acting in the premises.”). 
 11. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401 (1981). 
 12. Haugh, supra note 3, at 157. 
 13. Id. at 159. 
 14. See, e.g., Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Engine Switch Case, supra note 6 
(“GM killed over a [sic] 100 people by knowingly putting a defective ignition switch into over one 
million vehicles . . . [y]et no one from GM went to jail or was even charged with criminal 
homicide. . . . Today thanks to its lobbyists, GM officials walk off scot free while its customers are six 
feet under.”). 
 15. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Sally Quillian Yates to All U.S. Attorneys et al. 2 
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates Memo]. 
 16. See, e.g., Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the New York 
City Bar Association White Collar Crime Conference (May 6, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-
city-bar-association (“We cannot have a different system of justice–or the perception of a different 
system of justice–for corporate executives than we do for everyone else.”). 
 17. Rebecca Savransky, Loretta Lynch Praises Sally Yates for “Courageous Leadership,” THE HILL 
(Jan. 31, 2017, 1:41 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/317136-loretta-lynch-praises-
sally-yates-for-courageous-leadership. 
 18. Indeed, enforcement trends suggest the emphasis on individual accountability has not been 
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the accountability gap is real; the status quo is unsatisfactory; and the 
demand for individual accountability is appropriate and likely to 
continue in any political climate. However, the understandable 
response that calls for more aggressive prosecutions of individuals is 
misguided and potentially dangerous. Emphasizing more individual 
prosecutions in the corporate context will inevitably trend toward 
prosecuting relatively low-level employees, and away from the rule 
of law. 
This Article identifies two distinct challenges that necessarily 
confront any call for more individual prosecutions in the corporate 
context. First, incentivizing individual prosecutions fails as a 
procedural matter by systematically punishing lower-level corporate 
employees. Second, the effort is normatively flawed because it 
systematically punishes based on overbroad and unclear laws. To 
develop these arguments, this Article relies on both jurisprudential 
literature on the nature and function of criminal law as well as 
concrete examples of corporate misconduct and the criminal process. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the need for a 
change by illustrating the deterrent and expressive failures of the 
status quo that emphasizes entity-level accountability too often 
without attending to individual bad actors. Part II illustrates the 
inevitable failures of remedying the shortcomings of the status quo 
by enhancing individual prosecutions, and isolates two distinct types 
of failure: first, as a matter of procedure and corporate organization, 
such efforts will disproportionately impact lower-level employees; 
second, as a matter of substantive law, such efforts will create greater 
tension with the rule of law and undermine respect for the law. Part 
III suggests that civil liability represents a second-best option for 
remedying the shortcomings of the present approach, succeeding 
                                                                                                                 
merely cosmetic. See Helen Chandler-Wilde, Finance Regulators Target Executives in Accountability 
Shift, Secs. L. Daily (BNA) (Aug. 1, 2017) (“Executives faced four times as many financial misconduct 
probes by enforcement agencies in the U.K., U.S. and Hong Kong as firms did last year following the 
introduction of programs to hold individuals accountable, according to a report by New York-based 
corporate finance advisers Duff & Phelps.”). 
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where an emphasis on criminal law would fail, and mitigating the 
flaws of the status quo. 
We need greater accountability for misconduct within 
organizations. Failure to address this problem will further undermine 
public trust in the law. But the answer does not lie in criminal law. 
Civil penalties can establish individual accountability where criminal 
law has failed. Laws establishing civil liability already exist but are 
too often ignored. Civil penalties for individuals are not perfect, but 
they represent a second-best option that can mitigate the deterrent 
and expressive harms associated with the status quo. 
I.   Entity-Level Accountability Is Necessary, but Not Sufficient 
Traditionally, the criminal law did not apply to entities. There were 
serious questions about whether it would even make sense to subject 
an organization to criminal liability.19 Today, however, it is well 
settled (at least outside academia) that it is appropriate to hold 
corporations criminally liable.20 The law has been clear for more than 
a century: a corporation can be held criminally accountable for the 
acts its agents commit in the scope of their agency and on behalf of 
the corporation.21 
The Supreme Court accepted entity-level criminal liability with 
little thought or discussion. The New York Central & Hudson River 
Railroad v. United States decision is commonly identified as the first 
application of broad criminal liability to corporations.22 The case is 
                                                                                                                 
 19. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 464 (1765). Blackstone 
claimed it was impossible. See id. (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in 
its corporate capacity.”); see also Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 
63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 808 (1996) (“The classic view of the corporation’s potential criminal liability, as 
expressed by Blackstone, was that a corporation could not be held liable for a crime, although individual 
members could be punished for corporate acts.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Robert E. Bloch, Compliance Programs and Criminal Antitrust Litigation: A 
Prosecutor’s Perspective, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 223, 227 (1988) (“It has long been established that under a 
federal statute like the Sherman Act, a corporation may be held criminally liable for the acts and 
declarations of its officers, employees, and agents performed within the scope of their actual or apparent 
authority.”). 
 21. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. at 495. 
 22. Id. This was not the first time a corporation was held criminally liable, but it is the case generally 
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remarkable for its brevity and lack of analysis. Pam Bucy described 
the opinion as suffering from “three major flaws”: “failure to 
appreciate the inherently different nature of civil and criminal law”; 
“failure to consider the civil alternatives to corporate criminal 
liability”; and “failure to examine the alternative standards for 
imposing criminal liability upon corporations.”23 Bucy offers cogent 
criticism; the opinion does suffer from these deficiencies, and the 
first is the most problematic. Indeed, the very rationale for imposing 
criminal liability on corporations is nothing more than the 
observation that entities are responsible for their agents’ actions in 
the civil sphere.24 Whether and why this principle ought to extend 
into the criminal realm remains entirely unaddressed in this brief and 
significant opinion. 
Although criticism of the Court’s rationale for corporate criminal 
liability is widespread, scholars diverge on the ultimate question of 
whether corporations should be subject to criminal liability. Some 
have described entity-level criminal liability as inefficient and 
possibly purposeless,25 and sometimes irrational and nonsensical.26 
Others, including myself, have argued that corporate criminal 
liability does serve a function, and although precise formulations and 
rationales differ, most arguing in favor of corporate criminal liability 
do so because it has an expressive component that matters.27 
                                                                                                                 
identified with establishing a doctrine of corporate criminal liability. See, e.g., United States v. Van 
Schaick, 134 F. 592, 593 (1904); see also Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate 
Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 n.14 (2012). 
 23. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 
75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1114–15 (1991). 
 24. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. at 494 (explaining that “[a]pplying the 
principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that the act of the agent, while 
exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation,” can render the principle 
corporation criminally liable). 
 25. See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1477, 1499 (1996). 
 26. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1373 (2009). 
 27. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal 
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1235 (2016); Gilchrist, supra note 23, at 1; Samuel W. Buell, 
The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 473 (2006). 
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We ought to punish corporations qua corporations because the 
failure to do so fosters the dangerous message that corporations may 
price criminal conduct.28 Criminal law is special in that it entails a 
component of social condemnation.29 Corporations suffer none of the 
more dramatic bodily or psychological traumas routinely visited on 
real persons convicted of crimes; by removing even the societal 
expression of moral condemnation inherent in a criminal conviction, 
we leave corporations in a fundamentally different position relative 
to criminal law. For persons, the expression inherent in substantive 
criminal law is “thou shalt not . . . .”30 If corporations are subject only 
to civil penalties, the message is that everything is permitted, albeit 
priced.31 This is contrary to the nature and purpose of criminal codes, 
and it remains the best justification for imposing criminal liability on 
corporations. 
Entity-level liability is therefore necessary; it is not, however, 
sufficient. By itself, it fails to deter future wrongdoing, and too much 
reliance on entity-level liability introduces new expressive costs. 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Gilchrist, supra note 22, at 7 (“Immunizing corporations from prosecution would present its own 
symbolism: Namely, corporations may violate criminal laws if they are willing to pay for it. Corporate 
crime would thus be little more than a menu of harms and prices.”). Of course, not all substantive 
offenses are alike, and insider trading and securities fraud more generally raise some distinctive issues 
that make entity-level liability less attractive. Generally, firms are not prosecuted for illegal trading by 
their employees. See Howard J. Kaplan, Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading, Securities 
Litigation, A.B.A. (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/articles/fall2014-1114-corporate-criminal-
liability-insider-trading.html (“Although insider traders often work for business entities, their employers 
are rarely held criminally liable for their acts.”). For a comprehensive analysis of the reasons entity 
liability fails normatively and as a deterrent in most fraud on the market civil cases, see Jennifer H. 
Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 703 (1992). Fraud on the market is distinctive in that the set of victims will 
include the firm and other shareholders, and there is good reason to believe that the fraud stems from 
agency costs as managers act to protect themselves against poor performance. Id. at 702–03. Although 
Arlen and Carney are directly addressing firm-level civil liability, much of their analysis could be 
echoed for criminal liability in the securities context. 
 29. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 
(1958) (“[Crime] is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn 
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.”). 
 30. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 225 (1991). 
 31. Id. at 195–96. 
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A.   Insufficient Deterrence 
By any measure, deterrence is a central function of criminal law. 
Criminal law catalogues forbidden conduct, and by criminalizing 
conduct, society reduces the incidence of the conduct.32 There are 
important questions about the mechanisms by which, and the degree 
to which, deterrence works.33 Yet few would deny that criminalizing 
conduct deters that conduct to some degree.34 
Entity-level enforcement actions, however, are of particularly 
limited deterrent value for two reasons. First, in many cases, it is 
impossible to set entity-level penalties high enough to deter rational, 
wealth-maximizing conduct.35 Deterrence theory tends to be modeled 
on a simplistic economic approach to decision-making. In its most 
basic formulation, deterrence theory turns on imposing a cost that, 
even when discounted by the chance that conduct will go undetected 
or unpunished, outweighs the benefit to the person or entity deciding 
whether to engage in the conduct.36 For example, a corporation that 
secures a bid through bribery will be deterred only if the value it 
perceives in the winning bid is less than the penalty for bribery, 
discounted by the chance the bribery would remain unpunished. 
Since most corporate criminal conduct remains undetected, the 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2386 (1997) 
(describing deterrence, albeit skeptically, as the “grand unified theory” of criminal law). 
 33. See id. (explaining “the ways in which the deterrence question is more difficult than many of us 
have assumed and illustrates how criminalization can create unintended, and sometimes perverse, 
incentives”); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation 
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953 (2003) (explaining 
effective deterrence requires, at a minimum, notice, a perceived consequence greater than the perceived 
benefit of violation, and the ability to comport one’s behavior to rational standards, and cautioning that 
social science literature provides strong reasons to be skeptical about each of these). 
 34. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 33, at 951 (“There seems little doubt that having a criminal 
justice system that punishes violators, as every organized society does, has the general effect of 
influencing the conduct of potential offenders.”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02, Explanatory 
Note (identifying “the dominant theme [for the framework governing the definition of offenses] is the 
prevention of offenses”). 
 35. See Coffee, supra note 11, at 390 (“[T]he maximum meaningful fine that can be levied against 
any corporate offender is necessarily bounded by its wealth.”). 
 36. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1209 (1985) (“[T]he murderer will not be comparing the gain from the crime with the loss if he is 
caught and sentenced; he will be comparing it with the disutility of the sentence discounted by the 
probability that it will actually be imposed.”). 
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discount rate is necessarily high.37 The problem with applying this 
model to corporations is that corporations are frequently judgment-
proof to the penalties theoretically required to adequately deter 
wrongdoing. Corporations can only be compelled to pay what they 
have.38 Accordingly, a company’s wealth limits the punishment.39 
For a company that would be ruined by a million-dollar fine, there is 
no difference between a potential fine of $1 million and a potential 
fine of $100 million. Both pose existential threats. If the deterrence 
calculus necessitates a fine beyond what a company can pay, 
deterrence falters. 
The second deterrence failure of entity-only liability might be 
described as an agency cost,40 or a fundamental component of the 
separation of ownership from control.41 The only way for a 
corporation to act, or to commit a crime, is through its agents.42 
Generally, punishing the corporation involves imposing a fine and 
other remedial conditions.43 But whatever the form, any punishment 
of the corporation is reducible to money. And the money comes 
primarily from the owners of the corporation.44 The line between 
ownership and control of the corporation is the fundamental 
challenge for every component of corporate governance, and in this 
case the division is stark. Control violated the law, and ownership 
pays for that violation. 
A corporation functions through the actions of its board, officers, 
employees, and other agents.45 These real people making decisions 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Coffee, supra note 11, at 390. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1635 (2008) (“[A]gency costs include any losses the principal suffers 
because his agent pursues her own goals.”); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 
(1976). 
 41. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 40, at 309. 
 42. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (“[T]he only way in which a corporation 
can act is through the individuals who act on its behalf.”). 
 43. See generally Coffee, supra note 11, at 386–87. 
 44. See id. at 401. 
 45. See Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation As Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines 
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about corporate conduct have their own agendas, rationales, 
incentives, and risk tolerances.46 Paying a bribe to secure a contract 
the firm values at $1 million is not worth it to the corporation if there 
is a ten percent chance that paying the bribe will result in a $20 
million dollar fine. However, the corporation does not decide 
whether to pay the bribe; a corporate agent does. That agent—maybe 
a national manager who is concerned she will lose out on a bonus or 
promotion if she fails to meet a looming target—faces entirely 
different considerations. 
Sometimes the complexity of modern corporate conduct 
overwhelms the imagination. Simplicity clarifies. The piracy case 
Harmony v. United States against the brig Malek Adhel nicely 
illustrates the fundamental agency problem with using entity-level 
liability as a deterrent.47 During the summer of 1840, this cargo ship, 
captained by Joseph Nunez, set sail from New York to Guayamas, 
California (now Mexico).48 The journey quickly got off course.49 
Although the court records are limited, they make clear that a 
planned mercantile voyage transformed over the summer into an 
oddly inept sort of piracy.50 The court case does not clarify why or 
how the captain engaged in this conduct, but it does conclusively 
establish two key facts. First, the ship was engaged in acts of 
piracy.51 Second, the owners of the ship “never contemplated or 
authorized” the piratical acts.52 
Notwithstanding their uncontested innocence, the owners were 
punished. Their ship was seized by the United States for its violation 
of the Act of March 3, 1819, ch.75, “to protect the commerce of the 
                                                                                                                 
on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 55 (2015) (explaining corporations 
“can act only through its human agents”). 
 46. See Coffee, supra note 11, at 394–95; see also Ian B. Lee, Corporate Criminal Responsibility as 
Team Member Responsibility, 31 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 755, 758 (2011). 
 47. See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 222 (1844). 
 48. Id. at 230. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 212–20 (deposition of John Myers, acting first mate). 
 51. Id. at 232. 
 52. Id. at 230. 
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United States, and to punish the crime of piracy.”53 Reviewing the 
seizure, the Court concluded that the owners’ innocence was 
immaterial.54 The statute provided for action against any vessel 
involved in acts of piracy; the Malek Adhel was involved in acts of 
piracy, and therefore seizure was appropriate.55 Tellingly, the Court 
wrote, “[t]he vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the 
offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture 
attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or 
conduct of the owner.”56 
The analogy is not perfect, because this is not a case involving a 
corporation and the case involves forfeiture, piracy, and even a 
reference to the lawless status hostis humani generis.57 It is plainly 
distinguishable from modern corporate criminal cases. The lesson, 
however, is clear: the law does sometimes permit action against a 
thing, and the harm that action causes to the innocent owners of the 
thing does not prevent the action. 
The Harmony case offers three justifications for inflicting a 
financial penalty on the innocent owners. First, the action is against 
the vessel, not the owners, and their harm is incidental.58 Although 
supported by history, this formalistic division between in rem and in 
personam actions is unlikely to satisfy any but the most arcane 
readers.59 Second, the innocence of the owners is somewhat less than 
that of the victims of the piracy, and the owners’ property represents 
the “best and surest pledge for the compensation and indemnity to the 
injured party.”60 This second justification makes sense in the context 
of a piracy forfeiture; it carries less weight in the context of a 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 229. 
 54. Id. at 233. 
 55. Id. at 233–34. 
 56. Id. at 233. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 234 (“[T]he offence is primarily attached to the thing.”). 
 59. Indeed, Al Alschuler leverages the absurdity of blaming a thing as part of his critique of entity-
level liability. See Alschuler, supra note 26, at 1373 (comparing imposing criminal liability on a 
corporation to smashing a computer in frustration: “therapeutic, but it is not recommended for children 
or for grownups”). 
 60. See Harmony, 43 U.S. at 234. 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss2/2
2018] INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE CRIME  347 
corporate fine that will not directly benefit the victims of the 
misconduct.61 The third justification is only hinted at; the owners, 
although innocent, remain the party most capable of preventing this 
conduct in the future.62 The owners never contemplated these 
piratical acts, but piracy was a risk of merchant marine ventures, of 
which they must have been aware. How careful was their decision to 
have Joseph Nunez captain their ship? How fulsome was the 
interview? Did they conduct background checks? Did their actions 
meet industry best practices for evaluating risk? Maybe, after these 
innocent owners forfeit their ship, future owners would exercise 
greater care in choosing their captains. Maybe. 
The deterrence rationale is real, but of plainly limited effect. 
Particularly in the corporate context, ownership is separated from 
control such that any effort to deter future misdeeds by punishing 
shareholders succeeds only in the most ethereal and indirect manner. 
Whether it is correct or not, one can imagine that seizing a ship 
engaged in piracy might change the behavior of other ship-owners in 
such a way as to reduce future acts of piracy. And, one can imagine 
that when HSBC paid fines exceeding one billion dollars,63 
management at that bank and other large financial institutions paid 
renewed attention to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) compliance.64 Punishing ownership 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Although some money collected in corporate criminal fines is used to help victims, most of the 
money goes to the state or federal governments involved in the investigation. See, e.g., Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Collects More Than $8 Billion in Civil and Criminal Cases in 
Fiscal Year 2013 (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-collects-more-8-
billion-civil-and-criminal-cases-fiscal-year-2013. 
 62. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233. Forfeiture of the vessel is “the only adequate means of suppressing the 
offense or wrong.” Id. 
 63. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Press Release, supra note 4. 
 64. The compliance industry certainly continues to use the case to sell compliance products. See, 
e.g., Andrew Simpson, HSBC Still Chasing AML Compliance, Even After $680 Million Spend, 
CASEWARE ANALYTICS (June 1, 2016), https://www.casewareanalytics.com/blog/hsbc-still-chasing-
aml-compliance-even-after-680-million-spend. Whether such sanctions establish well-calibrated 
compliance is debatable; for more on rent-seeking risks inherent in internalized compliance 
responsibilities, see Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting 
Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care As Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 967 (2006) 
(discussing, in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley, the incentives for both external attorneys and consultants, 
as well as internal departments like “[i]nformation technology, internal audit, compliance, and legal 
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can generate deterrence, but the connection between ownership and 
control is sufficiently attenuated such that effective deterrence 
requires unwieldy penalties, and more reasonable penalties are 
unlikely to generate sufficient deterrence. In the Harmony case, the 
penalty—loss of the entire vessel—was plainly out of proportion 
with the scope of culpability: insufficient due diligence. A lesser 
penalty would have been fairer, but it would have failed to inspire 
other vessel owners to take note of the relatively small risk their 
captain would turn pirate. 
Entity-level penalties punish owners most directly. Owners are 
poorly situated, compared with management and corporate agents, to 
prevent future wrongdoing. Therefore, entity-level penalties are, at 
best, an inefficient means of deterring wrongdoing. At worst, they are 
an insufficient means of deterring wrongdoing. 
B.   Harmful Expression 
Deterrence is not the only, nor is it a sufficient, reason to impose 
entity-level criminal liability.65 Punishing the entity serves an 
important expressive role.66 Indeed, the expressive cost of 
systematically failing to hold entities criminally liable is a necessary 
component justifying corporate criminal liability.67 Absent the 
possibility of holding corporations criminally liable, the legal system 
sends a message that criminal conduct is merely priced, not 
forbidden, when engaged in on behalf of a corporation. This message 
is at odds with social norms; it is corrosive, and it threatens the 
perceived legitimacy of the legal system.68 
                                                                                                                 
services”). 
 65. There is little or no deterrence secured through imposing criminal liability on a corporation that 
could not be achieved equally through civil liability. See Khanna, supra note 26, at 1499 (“All of these 
sanctions [most commonly associated with entity-level criminal liability] are or can easily be made 
available in corporate civil liability regimes.”). 
 66. Gilchrist, supra note 22, at 6. 
 67. See id. (“[T]he most significant expressive value associated with corporate criminal liability is 
the expressive cost of immunizing corporations.”). 
 68. Id. at 49–50. 
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However, exclusively penalizing organizations for criminal 
conduct introduces its own expressive cost. By failing to hold the real 
people who engaged in wrongdoing accountable, the legal system 
sends the dangerous message that shareholders will indemnify crimes 
committed on Wall Street, while prison awaits those who commit 
crimes on Main Street. I previously explored this problem in the 
context of financial institutions,69 but it has a broader application. 
The problem can be described as one of affirmance: the systematic 
failure to punish individuals who commit crimes in the corporate 
setting not only fails to condemn, it can signal the conduct’s 
affirmation.70 
This concern—about the dangers of treating elite crimes 
differently than street crimes—has been echoed in a wide array of 
fora.71 A handful of commentators have already begun to identify 
public anger over this perceived double standard as a potential factor 
in the recent presidential election.72 A well-functioning legal system 
must be perceived as legitimate.73 The consistent failure to hold high-
level executives accountable for high-profile corporate misdeeds 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2014). 
 70. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to 
Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 871 
(2013) (“[A]ffirmance stands for the proposition that not pursuing or not punishing elite crime 
adequately can undermine the rule of law, diminish confidence in government, and promote further 
costly criminality.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 71. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 1 (suggesting the DOJ’s failure to prosecute high-level executives 
in the wake of the financial crisis risks appearing as “disregard for equality under the law”). When 
caught engaged in criminal conduct, large financial institutions “all were handed the equivalent of traffic 
tickets—pay a fine on your way out the door.” Robert Mazur, How to Halt the Terrorist Money Train, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/opinion/how-bankers-help-drug-
traffickers-and-terrorists.html. Entity-level settlements have “fostered concerns that ‘too big to fail’ 
Wall Street banks enjoy a favored status, in statute and in enforcement policy. This perception 
undermines the public’s confidence in our institutions and in the principal that the law is applied equally 
in all cases.” Letter from U.S. Senators Sherrod Brown and Charles Grassley to Eric Holder, U.S. 
Attorney General (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about /upload/01-29-13-Letter-to-
Holder-on-Wall-Street-Prosecutions.pdf. 
 72. See Morgenson, supra note 8; Cooper, supra note 8. 
 73. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Condemnation Without Basis: An Expressive Failure of Corporate 
Prosecutions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1134 (2013) (describing the relationship between the expressive 
value of legal action, the perceived legitimacy of a legal system, and the functionality of that system). 
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amounts to legal expressions at odds with public values and corrodes 
the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. 
II.   Individual Prosecutions for Corporate Misconduct Cannot 
Address the Accountability Gap 
If entity-level liability is insufficient, it seems reasonable to call 
for prosecution against the actual people who are causing the entity 
to engage in misconduct.74 Banks are aiding money laundering? Go 
after some bankers. Big Pharma is marketing for off-label purposes? 
Prosecute some executives. Car companies are cheating on safety 
measures? Lock up the C-suite. Action against senior officials would 
create powerful incentives to avoid future misconduct, and it would 
send an admirably clear message that criminal acts will be afforded 
no more tolerance in the corridors of power than they are in West 
Baltimore. 
The DOJ promoted this message in 2015. Then-Deputy Attorney 
General Sally Quinn Yates wrote to all federal prosecutors: 
One of the most effective ways to combat corporate 
misconduct is by seeking accountability from the 
individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing. Such 
accountability is important for several reasons: it deters 
future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes in corporate 
behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held 
responsible for their actions, and it promotes the public’s 
confidence in our justice system.75 
The memorandum directed federal prosecutors to concentrate on 
bringing criminal actions against individual wrongdoers in cases of 
corporate criminality and to amend the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 
accordingly, specifically the Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 1. 
 75. See Yates Memo, supra note 15, at 1. 
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Business Organizations.76 Furthermore, it provided that corporations 
should receive no leniency for cooperating with law enforcement 
unless the company discloses “all relevant facts about individual 
misconduct.”77 In this way, the memorandum not only instructs 
prosecutors to concentrate on individual prosecutions, it also 
incentivizes corporations to provide prosecutors the evidence they 
will need to do so. 
This effort, however understandable and even commendable, will 
meet only the most limited success. A few executives may pay a 
public price, but deterrence and expressivism will falter at the 
obvious arbitrariness of punishment.78 And the vast weight of the 
criminal justice system will fall mostly on lower-level personnel. 
Moreover, because of the breadth and vagueness of much of the 
substantive criminal law applicable in the corporate contexts, too 
many individual prosecutions will be sullied by the appearance of 
post hoc vengeance inconsistent with the basic principles of due 
process. This Part considers each of these failures in turn. 
A.   The Procedural Limits of Individual Criminal Prosecutions 
Individual prosecutions fall disproportionately on lower-level 
corporate agents.79 This is not a circumstantial error in prosecutorial 
discretion; rather, it is the predictable result of the corporate form and 
the process of corporate investigations. Consequently, any policy 
initiative intended to enhance the incidence of criminal prosecutions 
against individuals in the corporate context will generate the greatest 
impact among relatively low-level employees. 
This systemic bias generates costs. Disproportionately prosecuting 
lower-level employees undermines deterrence and threatens the 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 2–3. 
 77. Id. at 3. 
 78. Richman, supra note 1, at 276 (“Unless we are careful—or are ready for a more sustained 
commitment of resources—the message of a relative handful of prosecutions will be ‘a few heads will 
roll when the market takes a deep dive and the public seeks retribution.’ And the target deterrence 
audience will weigh the slim chance that lightning will strike them against the enormous financial gains 
from continued play.”). 
 79. RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, supra note 1, at 7. 
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perceived legitimacy of the legal system. Where the cost of crime is 
paid by a subset of those responsible, deterrence suffers because 
other prospective bad actors observe that most people involved in 
corporate wrongdoing get away with it.80 Where senior personnel 
consistently avoid being penalized for the decisions they make, there 
is no general deterrence for those who are similarly situated.81 
Expressively, the law appears arbitrary, if not institutionally biased, 
in favor of elites.82 The perception that the law treats people 
differently based on social status is at odds with the rule of law, and 
it undermines trust in the legal system.83 And the perception of 
differential treatment based on irrelevant factors causes these harms, 
whether the perception is accurate or not. As I will address further 
below, this perception in the corporate context is not entirely 
accurate—because frequently the relevant factor leading to disparate 
treatment is differential evidence or even differential culpability—but 
the perception itself is real, harmful, and not easily overcome. 
A legal system that appears to be engaged in scapegoating—or, to 
use Dan Richman’s memorable phrase, “corporate headhunting”84—
scares few and appears illegitimate. The specter of prosecution 
appears like the risk of shark attack: dramatic, frightful, and unlikely 
to happen to you. The stories of engineers or middle managers whose 
lives are overturned as they face the full arsenal of investigative and 
prosecutorial weapons wielded by the DOJ resonate tragedy and 
injustice.85 The public, rightfully angry at a harm caused by a 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 8. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See David Thacher, Channeling Police Discretion: The Hidden Potential of Focused Deterrence, 
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 533, 552 (2016) (“Overinclusive laws also contribute to arbitrary punishment—
to differences in treatment that result from accidents of fate, caprice, and other morally irrelevant 
factors.”). 
 83. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (“[T]he Rule of Law should guarantee against at least some types of official 
arbitrariness.”). 
 84. See Richman, supra note 1, at 265. 
 85. The pressure on the few, often-relatively-low-level, employees charged in instances of large 
scale corporate misconduct is immense. One can, with a little imagination, get a glimpse of the pathos of 
these cases in the recent New York Times obituary of Donald Vidrine, one of two rig supervisors 
charged with manslaughter following the Deepwater Horizon disaster. See Clifford Krause, Donald J. 
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corporation, finds itself unable to direct its blame at these targets.86 
The legal system thus accomplishes little while seeming mean-
spirited, arbitrary, or wrongheaded. 
Need it be so? Might not prosecutors use their broad discretion to 
bring cases that avoid these problems? Probably not. The problem of 
low-level targeting is largely unavoidable in our legal system, and the 
phenomenon is not new. When the DOJ indicts individuals in the 
corporate context, it rarely indicts senior corporate officials.87 
Todd Haugh recently provided an excellent example of the 
continued practice of prosecuting relatively low-level employees for 
high-profile failures.88 Kareem Serageldin was prosecuted for 
conspiracy to falsify books and records of a financial institution.89 
Serageldin was broadly portrayed (with plenty of assistance from the 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation) as a senior Wall Street official, and 
the crime was widely portrayed as importantly connected to the 
United States financial crisis.90 The agency rationale for this 
portrayal is clear. Following the financial crisis, there were no 
prosecutions of the people responsible.91 The criticisms—some 
misplaced—were strong.92 So, with Serageldin, the government had a 
responsive narrative: we are prosecuting senior Wall Street officials 
for wrongdoing leading to the financial crisis. 
                                                                                                                 
Vidrine, Supervisor on Ill-Fated Deepwater Horizon Rig, Dies at 69, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/business/energy-environment/donald-vidrine-died-deepwater-
horizon-supervisor.html. 
 86. See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, U.S. Bid to Prosecute BP Staff in Gulf Oil Spill Falls Flat, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-bid-to-prosecute-bp-staff-in-gulf-oil-spill-falls-
flat-1456532116 (describing the “ignominious end to the final case in the government’s effort to find 
individuals criminally responsible for the blowout on the Deepwater Horizon,” in which a drill site 
supervisor had difficulty describing what he did wrong to support his misdemeanor guilty plea). 
 87. Gilchrist, supra note 69, at 4. 
 88. See Haugh, supra note 3, at 153. 
 89. See id. at 155. 
 90. See id. at 155–56. 
 91. Gilchrist, supra note 69, at 4. 
 92. Id. at 45 (describing criticism of the DOJ for failure to bring more prosecutions and explaining 
why many of these criticisms were, while understandable, probably misplaced). 
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The problem, as Haugh makes clear, is that Serageldin was not a 
senior Wall Street official, and aside from temporal overlap, his 
criminal conduct had little to do with the financial crisis.93 
This phenomenon of rarely prosecuting individuals, and when 
doing so going after relatively low-level figures, is not isolated. A 
recently published study of the issue found that, between 2001 and 
2014, most corporate resolutions were not accompanied by an 
individual prosecution, and the minority that were brought 
prosecutions not against “high-up officers of the companies, but 
rather middle managers of one kind or another.”94 
The remainder of this Section explores the reasons for this 
imbalance in criminal accountability. The DOJ’s emphasis on 
individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing creates a real risk 
of problematically selective accountability. This bias toward lower-
level offenders is the result, first, of choice; second, of the process of 
internal investigations; and third, of organizational structure and 
decision-making. The conclusion one should draw from this is not 
that individuals should never be prosecuted in the corporate context; 
rather, the correct conclusion is that the effort to better police large 
organizations through encouraging more individual prosecutions is 
misguided, and potentially harmful. 
1.   Choice and the Problem of Non-Cooperation 
Shortly after the Yates Memo appeared, one significant problem 
was immediately identified.95 The new policies, though drafted with 
strong language, actually offer corporations a choice. “To be eligible 
for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the 
Department all relevant facts about the individuals involved in 
corporate misconduct.”96 Corporations can thus elect whether to 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See Haugh, supra note 3, at 156–57. 
 94. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1791 
(2015). 
 95. See Joh & Joo, supra note 45, at 58. 
 96. Yates Memo, supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
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cooperate and seek credit or to forgo credit and cooperation.97 To be 
sure, this choice is not new; corporations could always elect to not 
cooperate with a criminal investigation.98 And the new policies 
represent a shift toward coercing cooperation by rendering the 
choice, at least in theory,99 all or nothing. Nonetheless, by permitting 
the option of noncooperation, the policy suffers from the same 
agency problems that render entity-level deterrence so weak.100 
If the people running the investigation face criminal exposure 
themselves, the decision to forgo any cooperation credit for the 
corporation—credit that will take the form of monetary leniency 
spread across all ownership—will be easy. Some corporations will 
elect, through the decisions of self-interested agents, to forgo all 
cooperation credit.101 Senior management exercises significant 
influence over most internal investigations, and senior management 
is subject to a conflict of interest on the question of self-reporting 
where they face exposure. This possibility suggests that the pool of 
self-reported problems will be generated with a systemic bias against 
including cases of misconduct involving senior management. 
Of course, senior management does not always exercise control 
over internal investigations. Indeed, best practices dictate that when 
an investigation reveals a conflict of interest for the legal department, 
or whatever management role is leading the investigation, 
responsibility for the investigation must shift to a non-conflicted 
party, such as an audit committee.102 However, this shift happens 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See Joh & Joo, supra note 45, at 58. 
 98. Indeed, it is possible the Yates Memo changed nothing and amounts to little more than political 
talking points. See Joseph W. Yockey, Beyond Yates: From Engagement to Accountability in Corporate 
Crime, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 409, 411 (2016). 
 99. See infra, Part II.A.2. 
 100. See Joh & Joo, supra note 45, at 58 (arguing that “[a]n offer of leniency toward the corporate 
entity is unlikely to entice CEOs and other board members to incriminate themselves”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., JONES DAY, CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: BEST PRACTICES, PITFALLS TO 
AVOID 19–20 (2013), 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/upload/CII%20Best%20Practices%20Pitfalls%20to%20Avoid2.pdf 
(arguing that “where the corporation effectively is investigating its own management, the audit 
committee or a special committee of the board of directors would likely be convened for the specific 
purpose of supervising the internal investigation”). 
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when someone in a management or board position requires it to 
happen.103 Outside counsel can play an important role in effectively 
shifting authority over the investigation,104 but in many, many cases, 
management determines the scope and direction of the 
investigation.105 Similarly, one might point out that law enforcement 
is not solely reliant on internal investigations. Independent, external 
investigations exist, as do whistleblowers.106 So, there will be 
exceptions. However, given the significant role senior management 
plays in a significant number of internal investigations, one would 
expect a bias to manifest in disparate attention to corporate 
malfeasance for which senior management is not responsible. 
2.   Information Asymmetry and the Problem of Selective 
Cooperation 
The problem of non-cooperation is compounded by information 
asymmetry between law enforcement and those running the 
investigation.107 Information in most corporate investigations runs 
from those controlling the internal investigation to law 
enforcement.108 This is not always the case, of course. Some 
investigations involve whistleblowers who circumvent internal 
control of the investigation.109 Others involve traditional, external 
law enforcement tools, such as wiretaps and search 
warrants.110Moreover, companies disclose information to the 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 21. 
 104. Id. at 20. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations: Achieving Fairness 
for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73, 89 (2013). 
 107. Id. By law enforcement, the article refers broadly to the various persons and agencies responsible 
for investigating and prosecuting corporate malfeasance, including investigative agencies such as the 
FBI, as well as prosecuting attorneys such as those at United State Attorneys Offices, the DOJ, or state 
Attorney General offices. See id. 
 108. See Garrett, supra note 94, at 1845. 
 109. See, e.g., Office of the Whistleblower, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2017) (soliciting reports of securities 
violations and promoting significant financial rewards for whistleblowers). 
 110. These exceptions are functionally significant because the possibility of external detection of 
internal problems critically influences the internal deliberations about whether to self-report. See Jason 
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government. DOJ attorneys are perfectly capable of asking, and 
routinely do ask, substantive and procedural follow-up questions: 
who else saw this slide presentation; did you interview X; et 
cetera.111 At the end of the day, however, the federal government 
simply lacks the resources to police the vast majority of conduct 
within corporations,112 and enforcement relies heavily on internal 
investigations and self-reporting. In cases investigated internally, 
those controlling the investigation exercise considerable control over 
its course and extent. 
This control introduces the possibility that corporations will, in 
some cases, be able to withhold certain information about some 
individuals while still receiving cooperation credit, because law 
enforcement will be unable to discern the lack of candor.113 To the 
                                                                                                                 
Varnado & David Woodcock, To Self-Report or Not to Self-Report, TEX. LAW. (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202772652517/To-SelfReport-or-Not-to-
SelfReport?slreturn=20161114144555 (identifying the possibility of independent investigation by law 
enforcement and whistleblower reporting as two of the three primary reasons a company may elect to 
self-report). 
 111. See Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Ethics and Compliance Conference (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-assistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-
caldwell-22nd-annual-ethics (“Although the department welcomes and encourages corporate 
cooperation, we do not rely upon it. We conduct our own robust investigations—often alongside that of 
the company—to build our own criminal cases and to pressure-test corporate claims of cooperation.”). 
 112. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime 
Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 529 (2004) (“The concern of government oppression is much 
diminished in the corporate realm with respect to large firms. With large firms, the dynamic is reversed; 
government may well lack the resources to effectively investigate and litigate against its private 
opponent.”). Brown is mostly addressing the significant resources that large corporations must match to 
beat traditional law enforcement. The challenge, however, extends well beyond this fact. The set of 
“corporate conduct” is massive. It entails literally millions of decisions and actions every day, across the 
globe. Millions may be too small by an order of magnitude. Consider that there are about 3,000 
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange. NYSE Companies, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?exchange=NYSE (last visited Oct. 2, 
2017). Most of these are large; some are giant. If each listed company engages in 1,000 transactions per 
day (from entering a supply agreement with a foreign nation to purchasing new printers to hiring a news 
sales representative), there would be three million individual transactions per day. That is only counting 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. And 1,000 transactions per day is probably too few. 
The point is, the scale of conduct that occurs within and on behalf of corporations is so vast that any 
effort at external policing will, necessarily, only scratch the surface. 
 113. The Yates Memo itself acknowledges the opacity of internal corporate information. See Yates 
Memo, supra note 15, at 2 (describing the difficulties of obtaining detailed information about corporate 
conduct from an external perspective). 
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extent those in charge of the investigation face possible personal 
exposure, there is a strong incentive to limit the scope of the 
investigation. While there are some checks against self-interest 
corrupting the course of an internal investigation,114 they are not 
strong. 
It is therefore possible for organizations to selectively reveal 
information to law enforcement while maintaining the posture of a 
more complete disclosure. Internal investigations and self-reporting 
are, in this way, little different than civil discovery; the responding 
party is expected to make tactically beneficial decisions to the extent 
doing so is defensible. These tactics can serve both the interests of 
the organization and the interests of management. 
In the case of a particular wrongdoing within and on behalf of a 
corporation, the corporation possesses the most complete set of 
knowledge about the misconduct. An internal investigation proceeds 
with the primary goal of protecting the entity and the secondary goal 
of gathering the relevant information.115 One might object that the 
entity can only be protected once all the information is known. This 
objection rests comfortably only in the realm of the ideal. 
Investigations are messy.116 They involve information gathering, but 
also, inevitably, the dissemination of information.117 Sometimes the 
firm is legally barred from requiring confidentiality from its 
employees.118 And in any event, employees can, and often do, 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 8. 
 115. See JONES DAY, supra note 102, at 45. 
 116. Jason M. Knott & Sara L.A. Lawson, The Yates Memo Calls for Greater Focus on Individual 
Criminal Accountability for Corporate Crime: Who Wins and Who Loses?, A.B.A. LITIG. MATERIALS, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2016_sac/written_mate
rials/4_knott%20_who_wins_and_who_loses.authcheckdam.pdf. To list but a few examples, 
investigations can have a “negative impact on morale . . . [,] complicate the dynamic between outside 
counsel hired to conduct the internal investigation and the high-level executives who may have played a 
role in engaging this counsel,” and can cause “executives with even marginal exposure . . . to 
resign.” Id. 
 117. Id.; Banner Estrella Med. Ctr., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 137, slip op. at 2–3 (2015). 
 118. See Banner Estrella Med. Ctr., 362 N.L.R.B No. 137, slip op. at 5 (ordering that company to 
“[c]ease and desist from . . . [m]aintaining or enforcing a policy of requesting employees not to discuss 
ongoing investigations of employee misconduct”). 
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disregard confidentiality rules.119 As a result, one of the risks of 
conducting an investigation is that the investigation itself will put the 
entity in a worse position (for example, by increasing the risk of a 
whistleblower on an issue the entity would not have elected to self-
report). Fundamentally, lawyers conducting internal investigations, 
whether at the direction of senior management, a legal department, or 
an audit committee, are acting to benefit the company.120 This 
primary goal can be served in a variety of ways,121including more 
fulsome, or less fulsome, information gathering and internal 
remediation. 
The difficulty of discerning the corporate interest is a constant; 
however, the challenge is exacerbated where those being asked to 
identify the corporate interest have a potential conflict. Independent 
audit committees represent the most vigorous procedural check 
against the risk of self-dealing in investigations. Delegating to an 
audit committee the task of conducting an internal investigation, 
including the role of selecting outside counsel, helps mitigate the risk 
that the corporation’s best interest will be convoluted by the interests 
of management.122 If nothing else, the Yates Memo is likely to cause 
prosecutors to be less trusting of corporate investigations directed by 
management than those directed by boards or audit committees.123 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Merge Gupta-Sunderji, Three Reasons to Ignore your Company’s Policy Manual, THE GLOBE 
AND MAIL (Oct. 6, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/careers/leadership-lab/three-reasons-to-ignore-your-companys-policy-
manual/article26684784/. 
 120. See, e.g., Green & Podgor, supra note 106, at 74. 
 121. Id. at 91 (“The internal investigation industry basically operates with little oversight as the 
investigations are unmonitored and unregulated.”). 
 122. SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02 CIV. 4963(JSR), 2003 WL 22004827, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 
2003) (“[B]oards of directors, outside auditors and outside counsel are the gatekeepers of behavior 
standards who are able to prevent damage before it occurs if they are alert, and above all if they are 
willing to act when necessary.”). 
 123. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Stanford, CA. Speech: A Few Things 
Directors Should Know About the SEC (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542148863 (“Those of you who are directors 
play a critically important role in overseeing what your company is doing, and by preventing, detecting, 
and stopping violations of the federal securities laws at your companies, and responding to any problems 
that do occur. In other words, you are the essential gatekeepers upon whom your investors and, frankly, 
the SEC rely.”). This speech preceded the Yates Memo, but the view that enforcement will look to 
directors as gatekeepers, coupled with the requirements of fulsome disclosure in the Yates Memo, 
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Yet, although delegating investigative authority to an audit 
committee mitigates the risk of covertly limited investigations to 
protect individuals, it does not eliminate the risk. The fact remains 
that information flows upward in an organization, and throughout any 
process, including an investigation, senior management can exercise 
some influence on the process. 
Sally Yates, when announcing the new policies now known as the 
Yates Memo, said: 
Effective immediately, we have revised our policy 
guidance to require that if a company wants any credit for 
cooperation, any credit at all, it must identify all individuals 
involved in the wrongdoing, regardless of their position, 
status or seniority in the company and provide all relevant 
facts about their misconduct. It’s all or nothing. No more 
picking and choosing what gets disclosed.124 
Ultimately, this remains an aspirational demand, and the result is a 
systemic bias in the investigative process that favors senior corporate 
personnel whose interests will frequently align, or will be perceived 
as aligning, with those of the people actually running the 
investigation. 
3.   Organizational Hierarchy and the Distribution of Evidence 
and Culpability 
Lower-level personnel lack the institutional protections of their 
senior colleagues, and they will also be disproportionately targeted 
simply as a matter of evidence. This is an admittedly odd sentence, 
and hopefully it gives the reader pause. “Simply as a matter of 
evidence,” sounds like a tortured circumlocution to avoid saying that 
                                                                                                                 
suggest that the government sees the best compliance as board-driven compliance. 
 124. See, e.g., Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t. of Just., Remarks at New 
York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate 
Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-
quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school. 
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senior personnel did not commit any crimes. That criticism, 
addressed below, is fair and, in many instances, accurate. To begin, 
however, it is helpful to think about evidence. 
In almost all cases where law enforcement identifies corporate 
malfeasance, there exists at least one agent who caused the wrong. 
Corporations act through, and only through, their agents.125 If a 
corporation committed a crime, then, ipso facto, a person committed 
a crime on behalf of the corporation.126 As then-Assistant Attorney 
General Lanny Breuer put it: “Make no mistake: [w]hile the company 
is guilty, individuals committed these crimes.”127 Indeed, given the 
nature of most corporate malfeasance and organizational hierarchy, 
there will often be many responsible agents.128 The corporate agents 
who most directly committed the wrongdoing on behalf of the 
organization tend to be lower-level personnel. Simply because of the 
way organizational hierarchies distribute authority and 
information,129 in any given instance those who act on behalf of the 
organization tend not to be senior management. Crime often stems 
from small decisions: the decision to retain a particular agent to assist 
in bid procurement; the decision to accept a deposit without checking 
every AML know-your-customer box; the decision to book sales in 
violation of accepted accounting principles; et cetera. These 
decisions are made by personnel further down the organizational 
                                                                                                                 
 125. See, e.g., Green & Podgor, supra note 106, at 81–82. 
 126. One possible exception to this rule would be in jurisdictions allowing corporate mens rea to be 
established through the collective knowledge doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng., 
821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987). In such cases, it is possible for a corporation to be guilty of a crime 
even though no person exists who committed that crime, because the actions and mental states 
comprising the crime are attributable to different corporate agents, none of whom would have held the 
requisite mens rea, but who collectively can be used to hold the entity responsible. See id. 
 127. See Viswanatha, supra note 86. 
 128. See Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 81, 86 (2006) (“[M]any corporations are large decentralized groups of individuals, often 
with collectivized decision making structures and a multitude of actors participating in a single 
corporate act.”). 
 129. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and 
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1197 (2003). In the corporate context, “the principal has delegated 
a large amount of discretion to the agent—the principal hasn’t the time, expertise, or interest to make all 
the decisions personally.” Id. 
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hierarchy, and knowledge of these decisions is disproportionately 
housed further down the organizational chart as well. 
David Uhlmann describes the prosecutions following the BP 
Deepwater Horizon disaster as “a classic example”130 of a case where 
“the weight of criminal prosecution falls on individuals who, while 
culpable, had no control over the corporate policies that led to 
criminal activity.”131 Uhlmann notes “widespread agreement” that BP 
maintained a corporate culture that promoted risk-taking over 
environmental or workplace safety, and that this culture was the root 
cause of the disaster.132 Yet the only people charged with crimes 
following this preventable accident, which caused the death of eleven 
men and untold environmental degradation, were rig supervisors who 
“had no role in the development of BP’s policies or its corporate 
culture.”133 
The BP prosecutions were based on a key safety test that was not 
conducted properly; accordingly, those who conducted or directly 
supervised that test had the most exposure.134 On-site supervisors 
were responsible for the test.135 The first results were unclear; a retest 
led to similarly-unclear results.136 Subsequently, the supervisors 
consulted and eventually authorized drilling to proceed.137 There 
were 126 people aboard the vessel.138 Of these, only seven were BP 
employees, whereas the rest worked for the rig-owner, Transocean, 
or other subcontractors.139 Two BP employees, Robert Kaluza and 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1277. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, 122–26 
(2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf). 
 133. See id. 
 134. See Tom Fowler & Russell Gold, Engineers Deny Charges in BP Spill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 
2012, 7:20 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323622904578127173280594296. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See CHRISTINA INGERSOLL, RICHARD M. LOCKE & CATE REAVIS, MIT SLOAN MGMT., BP AND 
THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER OF 2010 1 (Apr. 3, 2012), 
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/LearningEdge/CaseDocs/10%20110%20BP%20Deepwater%20Horizon%20Lo
cke.Review.pdf. 
 139. See id. 
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Donald Vidrine, were eventually charged (although not convicted) 
with involuntary manslaughter, and committing a lawful act in an 
unlawful manner, leading to the death of another.140 They were also 
charged with negligence and inattention to duties while employed on 
a vessel, leading to the death of another.141 The alleged “unlawful 
manner” and negligence related exclusively to their failures in 
responding to the uncertain safety test results, and the eventual 
authorization to drill notwithstanding those results.142 Such failures 
will tend to be isolated around the event itself, even if a deeper cause 
of the failure is clearly identified in a problematic corporate 
culture.143 
Further from the event, evidence necessarily becomes more 
attenuated. Perhaps the supervisor’s training was inadequate or even 
misleading, but linking this failure to the eventual decision to drill 
notwithstanding uncertain test results—a decision that may occur 
many years and miles away from the training—is difficult. And the 
poor training case seems simple from the prosecutorial perspective 
when compared to the imagined prosecution of a senior executive for 
having set a tone that contributed to a culture of risk-taking, which 
undermined safety training and eventually led to a bad decision by 
someone he never met on a rig he never visited. The public was quick 
to scoff at senior DOJ officials who claimed that lack of evidence, 
not lack of interest, led to the dearth of individual prosecutions in the 
banking context following the financial crisis.144 But lack of 
evidence, and the evidentiary complexity of these cases more 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See Superseding Indictment for Involuntary Manslaughter, Seaman’s Manslaughter and Clean 
Water Act at 9, United States v. Kaluza, No. 12-265, 2013 WL 6490341 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/2520121115143638743323.pdf [hereinafter Superseding 
Indictment, Kaluza]. 
 141. See id. at 14. 
 142. See id. at 5–6. 
 143. In the BP case, these more serious charges were eventually abandoned by the prosecution or 
dismissed by the court. See Viswanathan, supra note 86. Mr. Vidrine eventually pled guilty to a 
misdemeanor offense, and Mr. Kaluza was acquitted at trial. See BP Engineer Is Not Guilty in Case 
from 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/business/energy-environment/bp-engineer-is-not-guilty-in-case-
from-2010-gulf-oil-spill.html?_r=0. 
 144. Yockey, supra note 98, at 413. 
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generally, is almost certainly the single most significant factor 
limiting individual prosecutions.145 
In the BP case, the real people charged, Kaluza and Vidrine, were 
the senior employees on site.146 They reported to John Guide, who in 
turn reported to David Sims, BP’s Manager of Drilling Operations 
for the Gulf of Mexico.147 Multiple lines of report up the chain sat 
Tony Hayward, who, in his three years as CEO, maintained an 
“aggressive growth strategy” and “spoke publicly about his desire to 
transform BP’s culture to one that was less risk averse.”148 
Kaluza and Vidrine made the decision to drill notwithstanding the 
inconclusive safety test results, and this formed the basis for their 
indictment.149 But they would have made this decision knowing that 
delay on an oil rig is incredibly costly.150 Indeed, subsequent 
investigation revealed that this particular drilling operation, because 
of weather and other delays, was already more than $20 million over 
budget.151 And Kaluza functioned in a culture that openly favored 
risk over safety.152 Kaluza and Vidrine likely assumed that their job 
security and potential advancement would turn on their functioning 
consistently with that culture. In the end, their decisions reflected 
these facts.153 
We may blame a culture of risk-taking, and disregard for safety 
and environmental regulations, for a disaster like the one on the 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 274–75 (2004). The lack of 
complex corporate fraud cases stems not from “prosecutorial footdragging” but rather from the 
complexity of the facts. Id. at 275. 
 146. Superseding Indictment, Kaluza, supra note 140, at 1. 
 147. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra 
note 132, at 97; see also David Hammer, BP Manager, Boss Both Ignored Warnings Before Deepwater 
Horizon Blew, Panel Learns at Oil Spill Hearings, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 26, 2010, 5:45 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/08/bp_manager_boss_both_ignored_w.html. 
 148. See INGERSOLL, LOCKE & REAVIS, supra note 138, at 3. 
 149. See Fowler & Gold, supra note 134. 
 150. See INGERSOLL, LOCKE & REAVIS, supra note 138, at 8 (“Transocean charged BP approximately 
$500,000 per day to lease the rig, plus roughly the same amount in contractor fees.”). 
 151. See Hammer, supra note 147. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See INGERSOLL, LOCKE & REAVIS, supra note 138, at 19 (“[C]ourt testimony indicates that the 
three key decisions [leading to the Deepwater Horizon disaster], and perhaps others as well, came down 
on the side of cost-reduction and expediency, over caution.”). 
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Deepwater Horizon. But when we look at culpable decisions made 
with mens rea, evidence will aggregate on the rig and dissipate as we 
move through the corporate structure to engineers onshore in Mexico 
and eventually to corporate executives in Europe. The locus of 
criminality rests, correctly, with those with “blatant culpability.”154 
Simply put, the hierarchy and structure of corporations mean that 
most corporate acts occur at levels many steps removed from central 
management.155 Such acts might be pursuant to the directives, 
policies, or tones set by central management, but lower-level 
personnel perform most corporate acts.156 For example, central 
management might set specific growth targets for the entity; product 
divisions then establish their own goals to achieve the net target; 
regional product divisions then set internal targets to contribute 
toward the larger goal; and a particular salesperson decides whether 
and how much puffery to engage in as he nears an unmet deadline. In 
a fraud case, the clearest evidence will rest with the sales person who 
made the untrue statements. It may be possible to craft a case against 
managers who set goals, if it can be shown they knew their goals 
could only be achieved through misrepresentations, but to describe 
the case is to realize it is orders of magnitude more difficult than the 
fraud case against the person who made the untrue statements.157 
Even in the case where management did have the requisite mens rea, 
finding evidence to support that fact is challenging.158 In many cases, 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Richman, supra note 1, at 270 (“The de facto requirement of blatant culpability—demanding 
that a defendant be shown to have had a subjective awareness of real wrongdoing—is anchored in our 
use of general jurisdiction prosecutors and judges and of lay jurors. It isn’t a bug in our system but a 
feature.”). 
 155. Peter J. Henning, A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?, 84 MISS. L.J. 43, 51 (2014) (“Many 
corporate officials are far removed from the day-to-day company decisions that can turn out to be 
fraudulent, so it is difficult to find evidence to establish their knowledge in the circumstantial 
evidence.”). 
 156. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 128, at 122 (“[C]orporations themselves encourage illegality for 
their own benefit, from sub rosa encouragement to fostering a culture of ‘making the numbers’ at all 
costs, including illegality.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 157. See Coffee, supra note 30, at 229 (“[C]overt signals from senior corporate management can send 
the implicit message throughout the organization that compliance with law is desirable, but increased 
profitability is mandatory.”). 
 158. Peter Henning has described this evidentiary problem: 
Unlike defendants who brandish weapons or traffic narcotics and stolen 
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however, simply as a consequence of the nature of decision-making 
and action within large organizations, senior management will, as a 
matter of fact, lack the requisite mens rea.159 
Some contend that the answer is to more effectively target high-
level personnel. One recent op-ed suggests increasing certainty of 
punishment as a means of enhancing deterrence.160 The classic 
formulation is to impose smaller penalties with greater frequency.161 
In the corporate context, however, this represents a false alternative. 
The failure to prosecute high-level corporate personnel does not stem 
from a problem with, or concern about, large penalties. Nor does it 
generally stem from a lack of enforcement resources. The failure, 
such as it is, results from narrow substantive laws with appropriate 
mens rea standards.162 Mere greed is not criminal. 
One option prosecutors have when they lack evidence of the 
substantive crime is to pursue the cover-up crimes. “[T]he reality is 
that many white collar criminals have been prosecuted using crimes 
that are ‘cover-up’ or ‘short-cut’ offenses, such as obstruction of 
justice and making false statements.”163 While there is value in 
prosecuting these sorts of offenses, the nature of corporate 
governance suggests these prosecutions will also be aggregated 
around particular personnel, and not necessarily the personnel most 
                                                                                                                 
property, whose denials of culpability are inherently suspect, a corporate 
manager can plausibly claim to have been ignorant of the details of a 
transaction, to not understand the full ramifications of what happened, or to 
have believed that there was nothing improper about a decision because 
other advisers—both inside and outside the company—never questioned its 
propriety. Ignorance of the law may not be an excuse for a crime, but it can 
be an effective defense when the violation requires proof of knowledge. 
Henning, supra note 155, at 51. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Robert H. Tillman & Henry N. Pontell, Corporate Fraud Demands Criminal Time, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 29, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2989ZkN (suggesting “imposing relatively short prison sentences 
on a much larger number of white-collar defendants”). 
 161. See Barry J. Pollack, ‘A Few Not So Good Men’: People Go to Prison, Nothing Changes, 14 
ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 1, 2 (2009) (“Studies uniformly show that consistent application of 
lesser penalties provides stronger deterrence than selective application of extreme penalties.”). 
 162. Henning, supra note 155, at 51. 
 163. See Ellen S. Podgor & Lucian E. Dervan, “White Collar Crime”: Still Hazy After All These 
Years, 50 GA. L. REV. 709, 715 (2016) (footnotes omitted). 
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responsible for the underlying wrongdoing.164 Compliance personnel 
and attorneys face the greatest exposure for so-called cover-up 
crimes, simply because reported malfeasance is generally directed 
toward them and the failure to respond can generate exposure.165 As 
with the systematic prosecution of actually-guilty-but-lower-level 
offenders, the systematic prosecution of gatekeepers fails to address 
the heart of the problem and risks devolving into something closer to 
vengeance than justice. 
Simply put, if prosecutors are pushed to bring individual cases 
where evidence is lacking, they will be compelled to prosecute 
lower-level offenders and more subsidiary crimes. To target the 
misconduct that most frequently exists among corporate 
management, the criminal law would need to address recklessness or 
negligence. That would be a mistake. 
B.   The Normative Limits on Individual Corporate Prosecutions 
Criminal law is inherently moral and expressive.166 In the 
corporate context, criminal law is “our most powerful tool for 
expressing what conduct is outside the bounds of acceptable 
corporate behavior.”167 However, the expressive component of 
criminal law is lost where the substantive law is unclear. Worse, post 
hoc imposition of criminal liability for conduct not plainly forbidden 
ex ante undermines the rule of law and generates a moral dissonance 
that threatens the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. The 
criminal law that applies in the corporate context is frequently 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Henning, supra note 155, at 53. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2009) (“[D]esignating conduct as criminal is important apart from any 
sanction imposed and that the application of the criminal law to an actor in society is a means to express 
a moral judgment about that actor’s conduct.”); see also Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of 
Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397, 400 (1965) (distinguishing punishment by reference to the necessary 
accompanying “expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval 
and reprobation”). 
 167. Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1263. 
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lacking in clarity, and efforts to harness these vague criminal laws to 
regulate corporate conduct more broadly are problematic.168 
1.   Overbroad and Unclear Criminal Laws 
The substantive law sets forth a code, and violations of that code 
are condemned. Some parts of the code are so fundamental as to be 
entirely uncontroversial among sane adults who made it through 
kindergarten: don’t murder;169 don’t hit;170 don’t take other people’s 
stuff.171 Other parts are less evident: you may not sell a BB gun to a 
minor in Massachusetts;172 you may not trade securities based on 
material non-public information; 173and you may not try to secure a 
business advantage by providing a thing of value to a foreign 
government official.174 Absent a clear code to the contrary, these 
latter offenses would be difficult to condemn.175 
                                                                                                                 
 168. To be clear, criminal prosecutions can and should be brought against individual actors who 
engage in forbidden conduct within a corporation. Nothing in this article should be understood as 
arguing to limit the scope of criminal prosecutions where the prosecutor can produce evidence of guilt 
sufficient to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of a sufficiently-defined crime. Corporate 
malfeasants can and should be punished. The current environment, however, sees a call for more 
aggressive prosecutions and less burdensome substantive laws; this article challenges these systemic 
efforts to enhance criminal prosecutions as a tool of corporate governance. 
 169. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (West 2017) (“No person shall purposely cause the 
death of another or the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy.”). 
 170. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (“No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause 
physical harm to another or to another’s unborn.”). 
 171. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (“No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of 
property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services . . . 
[w]ithout the consent of the owner . . . .”). 
 172. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 12A (2017) (“Whoever sells to a minor under the age of 
eighteen or whoever, not being the parent, guardian or adult teacher or instructor, furnishes to a minor 
under the age of eighteen an air rifle or so-called BB gun, shall be punished by a fine of not less than 
fifty nor more than two hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months.”). 
 173. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(j), 78(t), 78(ff) (2012); 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b-5-2 (2017). 
 174. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 et seq. (2012). 
 175. One might object that all crimes require a clear code in order to condemn. This objection is 
sound: ex ante clarity is a necessary component of condemnation. This difference between malum in se 
crimes and malum prohibitum crimes is that the former enjoy a degree of clarity even without a legal 
code, and this clarity is absent with the latter. In other words, the distinguishing characteristic of malum 
in se crimes is the widely-shared normative clarity that requires no reference to substantive law 
regarding these offenses. 
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While it is true that this distinction between malum in se and 
malum prohibitum crimes can be blurred, it remains useful at least to 
identify poles on a spectrum.176 It is wise, however, not to vest too 
much in the distinction, as it remains only as firm as the set of 
common moral norms. Just twenty years ago, Robinson and Darley 
wrote: 
[C]urrent law has extended criminalization beyond even the 
domain of traditional malum prohibitum offenses, to 
criminalize conduct that is ‘harmful’ only in the sense that 
it causes inconvenience for bureaucrats. Thus, most federal 
regulations are now routinely converted to federal crimes to 
give the regulators greater leverage in enforcement.177 
Undoubtedly, many would still agree with this statement, but the 
referent of the statement has probably shifted. Some number of 
offenses that would have seemed plainly malum prohibitum two 
decades ago now enjoy significant normative support, at least in 
some communities. For example, although adding a criminal penalty 
to a mine safety regulation178 at one point would have represented a 
clear example of a tool for giving “regulators greater leverage in 
enforcement,” the public interest in Massey CEO Don Blankenship’s 
conviction for conspiracy to violate this rule suggests that the popular 
norm surrounding mine safety has shifted.179 
Still, closer examination of the mining regulations suggests the 
alignment between public condemnation and legal violation is not so 
precise. The public anger against Blankenship stems from the 
                                                                                                                 
 176. It is precisely this failure of notice that helps bound legal culpability. Those who, by virtue of 
youth or mental disability or defect, lack the capacity to understand the requirements of law are excused 
from violations of the law. 
 177. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 479 (1997). 
 178. See 30 U.S.C. § 820(d) (2012). 
 179. See, e.g., Ken Ward, Jr., Ex-Massey CEO Blankenship now in California Federal Prison, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (May 12, 2016), http://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/20160512/ex-
massey-ceo-blankenship-now-in-california-federal-prison (detailing Massey reporting to serve his 
prison sentence). 
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perception that he disregarded the safety of his employees to 
maximize profits;180 this anger erupted when twenty-nine miners lost 
their lives in the Upper Big Mine Branch disaster.181 The indictment 
taps into this particular and compelling source of blame in its first 
paragraph, stating that Blankenship “fostered and participated in an 
understanding that perpetuated [the] practice of routine safety 
violations, in order to produce more coal, avoid the costs of 
following safety laws, and make more money.”182 But the actual 
regulation is, as would be expected, far more specific, revealing that 
the systemic violations involved failures such as maintaining 
insufficient pressure on water sprays meant to suppress dust and cool 
equipment.183 The widely-shared norm condemns decision-making 
that values profits over safety, at least where those decisions resulted 
in the tragic death of twenty-nine men. And it may also condemn the 
systematic and intentional disregard for specific regulations put in 
place to prevent that type of disaster. However, it is far less likely 
there is a widely-shared norm that would condemn reducing water 
spray below a regulatory threshold. Even among those savvy enough 
in mine safety to maintain a moral judgment about this relatively 
esoteric practice, the judgment would probably be tied to a concept of 
reasonableness for the particular operation, as opposed to the 
arbitrary number set by federal regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
 180. A highly critical Rolling Stone article gives a sense of the tenor of much of the public outcry. Jeff 
Goodell, The Dark Lord of Coal Country, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-dark-lord-of-coal-country-20101129 (describing how 
Blankenship “transformed himself into the embodiment of everything that’s wrong with the business 
and politics of energy in America today—a man who pursues naked self-interest and calls it patriotism, 
who buys judges like cheap hookers, treats workers like dogs, blasts mountains to get at a few inches of 
coal and uses his money and influence to ensure that America remains enslaved to the 19th-century idea 
that burning coal equals progress. And for this, he earns $18 million a year—making him the highest-
paid CEO in the coal industry—and flies off to vacations on the French Riviera.”). 
 181. Id. (citing the “fact that 29 men died violent deaths in large part because Don Blankenship ran 
what amounted to an outlaw coal mine, racking up more than 500 safety violations and nearly $1 million 
in fines last year alone”). 
 182. Indictment at 1, United States v. Blankenship, No. 5:14-cr-00244, 2014 WL 6386743 (S.D.W. 
Va. Nov. 13, 2014). 
 183.  Id. at 8. 
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The criminal law has drifted, and continues to drift, beyond the 
limited field of obviously immoral conduct into risk regulation.184 
Bernard Harcourt argued years ago that the harm principle, originally 
a necessary-but-insufficient condition for criminalization, had 
become toothless because harm is ubiquitous.185 He concluded that 
“harm is no longer in fact a necessary condition because non-trivial 
harm arguments are being made about practically every moral 
offense.”186 And, as both Harcourt and Joel Feinberg concede, the 
harm principle gives little or no guidance for comparing or weighing 
harms.187 If morality is no longer a necessary condition for 
criminalization, and the harm principle has metastasized into almost 
all human activity, then the answer to Feinberg’s original question—
“what sorts of conduct may the state rightly make criminal?”188—
may consist of little more than procedural requirements, such as 
representation, deliberation, and notice.189 
The emphasis on risk over morality in criminal law is particularly 
strong in the corporate context. Where substantive factors no longer 
bound criminalization, the procedural factors gain significance. As 
the law seeks to condemn conduct about which there is less shared 
and less obvious moral ground, it is increasingly reliant on 
establishing its own clarity. The law must plainly state that which is 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 98 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll sorts of 
perfectly harmless activity by millions of perfectly innocent people can be forbidden—riding a 
motorcycle without a safety helmet, for example, starting a campfire in a national forest, or selling a safe 
and effective drug not yet approved by the Food and Drug Administration. All of these acts are entirely 
innocent and harmless in themselves, but because of the risk of harm that they entail, the freedom to 
engage in them has been abridged.”). 
 185. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
109, 114 (1999). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. Feinberg concedes that, ultimately, the harm principle is “largely an empty formula”; 
however, he also introduces a catalogue of comparative principles “meant to help the hypothetical 
legislator by providing his nearly vacuous guiding principle with a little more content, a little clearer 
direction.” JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 188, 203 
(1984). 
 188. Feinberg, supra note 187, at 3. 
 189. Indeed, this seems to be the view expressed by Justice Scalia in Morales. See Morales, 527 U.S. 
at 73–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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forbidden and punish only that which is forbidden.190 Failure to do so 
leaves people subject to condemning punishment191 for behavior not 
subject to any widely-shared norm, unlimited by any cogent harm 
principle, and without notice. In such instances, the condemnation 
inherent in punishment falters and we are left with something more 
like a tantrum than a principled punishment. If we are to punish 
without moral grounding, then clarity of notice becomes critical. 
Unfortunately, the criminal law that is generally applied in the 
corporate context is not at all clear. Substantive corporate law—that 
is, the set of rules governing conduct in the corporate setting—is 
broad and in a near-constant state of flux. Questions about the scope 
of prohibited conduct under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act are seemingly limitless.192 Early efforts to govern 
corporate conduct—through administrative civil actions—involved 
enforcement decisions with retroactive definitional impact.193 In the 
administrative context, what appeared to be overbroad substantive 
laws were upheld as lawful delegations of authority.194 These early 
efforts to govern corporations may be the foundation for the vague 
standards and imprecise language that characterize much of the 
substantive corporate criminal law today.195 The result is plain: the 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 48 (1997) (“The moral nature of the criminal law should not be undercut by 
permitting the criminal punishment of those who cannot fairly be blamed for their actions.”). 
 191. To punish is to blame. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 98 (1970) (identifying the “symbolic significance” and the “expression of attitudes of 
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation” as distinctive aspects of 
punishment). 
 192. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 472 (1996). 
 193. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
 194. Id. at 197. The controlling statute in Chenery was the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935, which empowered the SEC to limit the issuance or sale of securities. 
 195. Id. at 208. The connection between the legal underpinnings of the expanding administrative state 
and expansive criminal laws is limited. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of Chenery, and subsequent 
decisions grounding the administrative state, is the subject matter policy expertise of designative 
executive agencies. The DOJ and U.S. Attorneys—the executive actors most responsible for 
interpretation and enforcement of criminal laws—have admirable expertise, ability, and independence; 
but, with the exception of a few anomalous divisions within DOJ, few would claim these executive 
actors exercise strong subject matter expertise over the matters governed by corporate criminal law. 
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scope of potentially-forbidden conduct in the corporate context is 
broad and poorly defined.196 
Insider trading is replete with uncertainty. Scholars have mounted 
a sustained attack on the lack of clarity in insider trading law.197 
Honest services fraud has been subject to continued attack as 
impermissibly vague.198 Corruption law is little better.199 
The breadth and lack of clarity in corporate criminal law are not 
new. Ellen Podgor wrote in 1994 that “white collar crime is changing 
so rapidly that it is difficult to provide a firm or constant setting for 
its understanding.”200 Nearly a decade and a half earlier, Jed Rakoff 
wrote of the possibility that “the scope of the mail fraud statute is too 
great, either in requiring only a very minimal amount of 
reprehensible conduct to trigger its application or in extending its 
application to an immensely broad and as-yet ill-defined spectrum of 
intentions and activities . . . .”201 Many of the criminal laws that 
                                                                                                                 
 196. This point is related to, but distinct from, complaints about overcriminalization. 
Overcriminalization refers to the state of criminalizing far more conduct than should or could be 
enforced. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags 
to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005). There are many serious problems stemming 
from overcriminalization, including the possibility of over-incarceration. But see Peter J. Henning, 
Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives for Corporate Violations, 2012 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 91, 107–08 (“The critique that there is overcriminalization appears to be used more as a 
placeholder to describe how the criminal law has expanded so that there are too many defendants being 
prosecuted and incarcerated, sometimes for significant periods of time.”). One problem of criminalizing 
too much conduct is that it “give[s] enforcement authorities far too much unchecked discretion to select 
those few cases that will actually be prosecuted.” Beale, supra, at 766. The breadth and poor definition 
of laws applied to corporate conduct trigger this concern in particular. 
 197. See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 TEMP. L. 
REV. 273, 274 (2016); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality 
Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1000–01 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway, 
Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 
1133–34 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (Oct. 
2016), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/informational-cronyism/ (describing the massive 
uncertainty inherent in the line between civil and criminal enforcement being defined by the 
“inexcusably elusive” standard of “willfulness”). 
 198. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010) (limiting honest services fraud under 
18 U.S.C. § 1346 to bribe and kickback schemes). 
 199. The Supreme Court recently brought needed, if still too little, clarity to corruption law. See 
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2367–68 (2016) (limiting the meaning of “official act” 
under 18 U.S.C. § 201). 
 200. See Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 391, 391 (1994). 
 201. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 821 (1980) 
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apply to corporate actors are expansive and poorly drafted, and they 
fail to give notice as to what conduct is forbidden. Some uncertainty 
is unavoidable, if only as the consequence of our reliance on a 
language that is organic and less-than-mathematically precise.202 
Much of the criminal law in the corporate context, however, remains 
problematically uncertain. 
2.   One Rule of Law Problem: Unbound Discretion 
The rule of law is very near to a first principle in legal theory, and 
yet, or perhaps because of that, it suffers from a lack of analytic 
precision.203 This is probably more of an academic problem than a 
practical one. Practicing attorneys and judges refer to the rule of law 
with considerably less skepticism and confusion than scholars.204 
Putting aside the fundamental definitional challenges, a basic and 
relatively uncontroversial aspect of the rule of law is a limit on the 
power to deprive others of life, liberty, or property, except where 
there exists a predetermined set of conditions that permit that 
deprivation.205 The problem with this description, however, is that by 
failing to define the condition pursuant to which one may be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, it is rendered empty. For example, were it 
established that one may be deprived of life, liberty, or property if 
                                                                                                                 
(advocating a jurisdictional approach to the use of mails element, while recognizing the possibility that 
this would cause the mail fraud statute to become unmanageably broad). 
 202. See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 335, 357 (2005) (“However, there is no requirement that a criminal statute include only words that 
are subject to ‘mathematical certainty.’”). 
 203. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 41 (“Viewed through skeptical lenses, the Rule of Law might 
appear, at best, to be no more than an honorific title for an amalgam of the values, and the preferred 
means for promoting those values.”). Fallon rejects the skeptical lenses, but the uncertainty surrounding 
this widely-used concern is undeniable. 
 204. See, e.g., Savransky, supra note 16. In response to now-former-Acting Attorney General Sally 
Yates’s refusal to enforce President Trump’s executive order barring entry for people from seven 
predominantly Muslim nations, the former-Attorney General Loretta Lynch stated, “With her decision 
not to defend the executive order regarding immigration, Sally Yates displayed the fierce intellect, 
unshakeable integrity, and deep commitment to the rule of law that have characterized her 27 years of 
distinguished service to the DOJ under both Democratic and Republican administrations.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 205. See Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority: Lessons from the Law of 
Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99, 105 (2007). 
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and only if the king deemed it appropriate, that would establish a 
limiting principle, but it does not describe what people refer to when 
they speak of the rule of law. 
Jennifer Arlen proposes a normative hook via an instrumental 
conception of the rule of law captured as a series of limits on the 
authority of various governmental actors to exercise discretion.206 
She posits that the primary mechanism for limiting discretion and 
promoting the rule of law entails maintaining a separation between 
“three separate exercises of authority: authority to create duties, 
authority to interpret existing duties, and authority to enforce duties 
and sanction their violation.”207 By ensuring that “no individual actor 
or office enjoys all three forms of authority,” legal systems limit 
discretion and promote the rule of law.208 Lawyers and civics 
students alike can easily recognize this pattern. Separation of powers: 
the legislature makes the laws, the judiciary interprets the laws, and 
the executive enforces the laws.209 
Law enforcement in the corporate context has deviated too far 
from this model. True, the legislature makes the laws. But by 
enacting laws that are expansive in scope and imprecise in limit, the 
legislature puts too small a limit on the scope of enforcement 
discretion. Indeed, there may be no better example than securities 
fraud by which to undermine the oft-repeated claim210 that federal 
criminal law is statutory.211 Much substantive criminal law has been 
written by courts.212 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 191 (2016). 
 207. Id. at 193. 
 208. Id. 
 209. The link between the rule of law and separation of powers is not new. See GORDON S. WOOD, 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 150–61 (1992). Wood contends that “[w]hen 
Americans in 1776 spoke of keeping the several parts of the government separate and distinct, they were 
primarily thinking of insulating the judiciary and particularly the legislature from executive 
manipulation.” Id. at 157. This point is particularly interesting in the context of white collar 
prosecutions, and arguably all prosecutions, where the executive has continued to expand its authority 
over almost all aspects of the criminal process. 
 210. See Kahan, supra note 192, at 471 (“[T]he proposition that federal crimes are ‘solely creatures of 
statute’ is a truth so partial that it is nearly a lie.”) (footnote omitted). 
 211. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider 
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This is not to suggest enforcement discretion is unbounded; it is 
not. As Russell Covey points out, “true unguided discretion is 
extremely rare, if not altogether absent, in law.”213 Indeed, one might 
respond that this is necessarily true, as “true unguided discretion” 
represents the absence of law.214 This, however, misses Covey’s 
point. Covey is not making a claim about the nature of law; he is 
describing the situation that in modern, functioning legal systems—
even those that might deviate from the rule of law in certain ways—
actual unbounded discretion rarely occurs.215 This is almost certainly 
true of the legal system in the United States. 
For example, prosecutorial discretion is often referenced as one of 
the least restricted forms of discretion in the criminal justice system, 
and for good reason. Courts have consistently refused to exercise 
meaningful review over the prosecutor’s discretionary decisions.216 
But prosecutorial discretion is not unbound. A prosecutor’s decision 
about whether to charge remains limited by a host of factors, 
including the evidence available to present to a grand jury, the 
potential ire of the judge in front of whom she must repeatedly 
appear, the supervision of her superiors, and her officer’s answer to 
the political process. Complaints about prosecutorial discretion tend 
not to be that the discretion is unlimited, but rather that the limits are 
insufficient.217 
                                                                                                                 
Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1201 (1995) (“The federal insider trading 
prohibition thus is best classified within the genus of federal common law.”); Samuel W. Buell, What Is 
Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 545 (2011) (“The law of securities fraud is one of the most 
heavily judicially created bodies of federal law.”). 
 212. Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 64, 68 (Michael Klarman, David 
Skeel & Carol Steiker eds., 2012). 
 213. See Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CAL. L. REV. 
449, 450 n.13 (2016). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). 
 217. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutorial Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 
581–82 (2009) (describing the failure of the political process as a meaningful limit); David Keenan, 
Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer, The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After 
Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 210 (2011) (describing the failure of codes of 
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Poorly-drafted, uncertain, and potentially-overbroad laws represent 
the legislature’s failure to limit the discretion of the executive 
enforcement function. The claim in the corporate criminal context is 
not about absolute discretion; it is about excessive discretion. Given 
the poor state of substantive laws, the legislative limit on the 
executive falters. Arlen’s instrumental theory of the rule of law 
points to one solution: review and interpretation by courts.218 Some 
laws do too little to define the forbidden and thus do little to limit 
discretion, and in those cases courts will strike the law as void for 
vagueness.219 The complaint against most corporate criminal laws is 
not that they set no standard at all, but rather that they require “a 
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible 
normative standard.”220 Courts can and do mitigate this type of 
imprecision through their interpretive function.221 
3.   Another Rule of Law Problem: Notice 
Punishment absent notice is not law; it is the mere exercise of 
power.222 Fundamental to the rule of law is the principle that those 
subject to the command of law must be given notice as to both the 
forbidden or required conduct and the penalty for non-compliance.223 
In practice, this principle is as obvious as it is difficult to manage. 
The rule of lenity offers respite against failures of notice, which 
are frequent in the white-collar context.224 In practice, however, the 
rule of lenity has not served this function, because courts too 
                                                                                                                 
conduct as a meaningful limit). 
 218. See generally Arlen, supra note 206. 
 219. See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 60 (“This ordinance is therefore vague ‘not in the sense that it 
requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but 
rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’”) (quoting Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). 
 220. Coates, 402 U.S. at 614. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Robinson, supra note 202, at 336 (“In its original Latin dress, the legality principle was 
expressed as ‘nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege,’ meaning roughly ‘no crime without law, 
nor punishment without law.’”). 
 223. Id. (“[C]riminal liability and punishment can be based only upon a prior legislative enactment of 
a prohibition that is expressed with adequate precision and clarity.”). 
 224. Id. at 346–47. 
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frequently decline to apply the rule.225 Perhaps judicial disfavor 
develops because the rule would accomplish too much. Justice 
Breyer, after identifying cases invoking the rule of lenity, noted that 
“[t]he problem of statutory interpretation in these cases is indeed no 
different from that in many of the criminal cases that confront us.”226 
Perhaps the lack of clarity in criminal laws is the norm, not the 
exception. And if that’s the case, a vibrant rule of lenity may well 
devolve into a simplistic and unworkable mechanism that 
“automatically permits a defendant to win.”227 
In the corporate context, lack of clarity is the norm, and common 
law refinement fails to address the notice problem. To satisfy due 
process, “a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense (1) with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and (2) in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”228 The judicial process is 
an imperfect fix in an imperfect world; courts introduce clarity to 
vague statutes over time, but the cost is significant where people are 
punished for conduct that was not plainly forbidden. 
4.   The Common Law “Solution” 
The solution to overbroad and unclear criminal laws, such as it is, 
has been for courts to offer clarity incrementally. Common law 
crimes are generally considered anathema to basic principles of 
legality.229 However, as Dan Kahan describes, a “system of federal 
common law crimes” not only exists; it does so “(in part) because it 
works so much better than the imaginary regime of legislative crimes 
ever would.”230 As described above, federal criminal laws are more 
                                                                                                                 
 225. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (describing a rule of lenity of 
extremely limited scope, applying only in the rare case where the statute is so unclear as to leave the 
courts with “no more than a guess as to what Congress intended”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 226. See id. at 139. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 357 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229. See Kahan, supra note 192, at 469. 
 230. Id. at 470. 
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often than not open-ended, vague, and unclear. This is particularly 
true in the corporate context. Often, this is true by design.231 This is a 
problem, and courts are a solution. 
Or rather, a partial solution. The incremental refinements imparted 
by judicial review of real cases and controversies capture the nuances 
of life as no cloistered code ever could.232 As a mechanism for 
developing good rules, it is difficult to imagine a better approach. 
However, Kahan’s pragmatism about definitional capacity offers 
little comfort to those “languishing in prison [where no] lawmaker 
has clearly said they should.”233 Criminal law remains our best tool 
for designating certain conduct beyond the pale in terms of 
acceptable corporate behavior.234 But much of the conduct designated 
as criminal is by no means beyond the pale—this conduct is too 
broad, too ill-defined, and too widely-practiced.235 Post hoc decisions 
designating the behavior criminal do nothing to address this problem. 
A common law approach to criminal law overcomes limited 
legislative imagination, but it falters on the notice problem. 
5.   The Cost of Imposing Criminal Liability Without Notice 
The imposition of criminal punishment ought to be different in 
kind than the imposition of civil liability. Even assuming identical 
penalties—e.g., deprivation of property—there remains a difference 
between conviction of a crime and a finding of liability. Criminal law 
condemns,236 and the condemnation rings hollow where it is based on 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Sam Buell tackles this problem head-on regarding fraud, writing that “[f]raud is somewhat like 
negligence in that it is designed to be an all-encompassing concept of wrong that a common-law system 
of adjudication can deploy as needed and define as it goes along, addressing cases ex post.” Buell, supra 
note 211, at 520–21. 
 232. John Hasnas, Reflections on Prince, Public Welfare Offenses, American Cynanamid, and the 
Wisdom of the Common Law, J. CRIM. LAW AND PHIL. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2) (on file 
with Georgia State University Law Review). 
 233. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 234. See Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1263. 
 235. For more on the challenging relationship between criminal law, regulation, and institutional 
politics, see Richman, supra note 1, at 265 and Richman, supra note 212, at 65. 
 236. See FEINBERG, supra note 191, at 92, 98 (1970) (identifying the “symbolic significance” and the 
“expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and 
reprobation” as distinctive aspects of punishment); see also Hart, supra note 29, at 404 (“What 
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a post hoc definition of a rule grounded only in positive law. The 
laws are broad; they are unclear; and sometimes they are actually 
indeterminate before the fact. Imposing criminal liability under these 
conditions threatens to dilute—if not eliminate—the sole distinctive 
component of the criminal law, moral condemnation, because we 
cannot sensibly blame people for behaving in a manner that is neither 
morally problematic on its own terms nor plainly forbidden by 
law.237 
When those who could not have known they were violating the 
law are punished, it is sometimes rationalized by reference to 
assumption of risk. As a British Lord famously put it: “Those who 
skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which will denote 
the precise spot they fall in.”238 But, as this colorful quote illustrates, 
assumption of risk fails to capture the expressive component of 
criminal punishment; perhaps the person who skated too close to thin 
ice cannot complain about getting wet, but we might not condemn 
him. This is particularly true in the corporate setting, where entire 
industries exist to help people and corporations profitably operate 
near poorly-defined legal limits.239 Forget the lone daredevil; 
consider instead a cautious village that thrives when it sends 
fishermen near the edge of the ice. 
III.   A Better Approach: Civil Accountability 
Redoubling efforts to prosecute individuals in the corporate 
context will fail. The accountability gap will persist, and the result 
will be something more like show trials against mostly lower-level 
                                                                                                                 
distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment 
of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). 
 237. See Lynch, supra note 190, at 47 (“Both in justice to those so labeled, and to preserve the 
always-threatened moral capital of the criminal law from dilution, conviction of crime must ordinarily 
be reserved for those who violate deeply held and broadly agreed social norms.”). 
 238. See Knuller Ltd. v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecution (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 633 (HL) 652 (appeal taken 
from UK); see also Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (“[I]t is not unfair to 
require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the 
risk that he may cross the line.”). 
 239. See Lynch, supra note 190, at 45. 
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employees who are present at the locus of the problematic decisions. 
Complaints about the state of corporate law enforcement do not stem 
from a failure to prosecute engineers, sales reps, or middle managers. 
Yet these are the prosecutions we should expect law enforcement to 
generate by redoubling our law enforcement efforts to charge 
individuals; strong cases with good evidence cluster further down the 
corporate hierarchy.240 
The problem with corporate law enforcement, writ large, is one of 
accountability. Corporations exert influence throughout our 
economy, our environment, and our society. The specific decisions 
that have positive and negative effects are often made well down the 
organizational chart, simply because that is the nature of decision-
making in large organizations.241 But those decisions are not made in 
a vacuum. They are made in the context of an organizational culture 
that pushes behavior in a particular direction. Culture is complex, 
both as a matter of composition and effect.242 Exactly what creates 
the culture is not susceptible to careful analysis, and there is little 
precision to inquiries about how culture influenced a particular 
decision. It is now uncontroversial to maintain that BP, prior to the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, maintained a culture that favored risk 
over safety.243 But this observation leaves two questions: who is 
responsible for that culture, and how did that culture influence the 
decisions on and around the rig in the hours and days leading to the 
disaster? Neither question is well-suited for the blunt machinery of 
criminal justice, which favors the binary choice between guilt and 
innocence. 
Outside the sphere of criminal law, however, the questions are 
easier. Senior executives and directors establish, maintain, and 
promote an organizational culture.244 Perhaps no single speech will 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See Henning, supra note 155, at 53. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 1123–27 (summarizing the literature examining distinctions in 
corporate cultures). 
 243. See Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1277 (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON 
OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 132, at 122–26). 
 244. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn 
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capture the culture, but culture flows inevitably from the behavior, 
decisions, and incentives established by leadership. The 2016 scandal 
at Wells Fargo stands as a stark reminder of how a corporate culture 
can be influenced by overly aggressive sales quotas and incentives, 
and how such a culture can manifest in illegal conduct by lower-level 
employees.245 Yet many corporate cultures are more nuanced. They 
are built on years of behavior by key corporate actors, including 
promotion decisions and other incentives, as well as more direct 
messages about the values of the corporation.246 Understood this 
way, culture is both simple and imprecise. 
People understand organizational culture, and we understand it 
influences behavior, but with any particular question of 
accountability the inquiry tends to falter. When GM failed over the 
course of a decade to recall cars with faulty ignition switches,247 we 
now know this failure had to do with GM’s culture, but not in a way 
that fits with the evidentiary standard necessary to impose criminal 
liability. 
This creates the accountability gap. The public blames senior 
management for corporate wrongdoing.248 The blame is not irrational 
anger. It is grounded in the recognition that the most directly culpable 
and lower-level employees did not get lax about controls or violate 
the law in a vacuum; they did so in an environment that encouraged 
them to take these risks. But this imprecise blame does not comport 
with basic principles of legality for imposing criminal liability. We 
are left, accordingly, with criminal liability for the entity and 
                                                                                                                 
from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 542 (2008). While “tone at the 
top” is the core of organizational culture, as Baer notes, all organizational actors play a role in defining 
that culture. Id. (“The creation of the organization’s ethical culture is generated both by the company’s 
directors and officers—who set the ‘tone at the top’—by its lawyers and accountants, and by the 
multitude of mid-level managers who interact with rank-and-file employees.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 245. Emily Glazer, How Wells Fargo’s High-Pressure Sales Culture Spiraled out of Control, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wells-fargos-high-pressure-sales-
culture-spiraled-out-of-control-1474053044. 
 246. See Baer, supra note 244, at 541. 
 247. David M. Uhlmann, Justice Falls Short in G.M. Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/opinion/sunday/justice-falls-short-in-gm-case.html?mcubz=0. 
 248. See Uhlmann, supra note 27, at 1265. 
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sometimes for some low-level employees, and little or no 
accountability among senior management who contributed to and 
profited from the culture that bred the misconduct. 
A.   The Blame Being Assigned Is for Recklessness 
Peter Henning explored the accountability gap, and in doing so, he 
isolated heightened mens rea requirements as the most significant 
reason so few senior executives are prosecuted in these cases.249 
“[O]ne potential response . . . may be to reduce the requisite intent 
element, so that it is easier to pursue a case and establish a violation 
when there are substantial losses from corporate decisions.”250 To be 
clear, Henning is not advocating a recklessness standard; he is 
exploring the costs and benefits of such a standard, simply because it 
is the simplest fix if we conclude that the failure to prosecute senior 
management for corporate misconduct requires remedying.251 
The call for a recklessness standard is important because it 
perfectly captures the source of public condemnation. As described 
above, the public blames those whose recklessness causes harm; but, 
it is worth recognizing that the public also likely celebrates those 
whose recklessness generates profits or success.252 The problem in 
the corporate context is that management must make decisions about 
fantastically complex markets with radically imperfect 
information.253 Gauging the correct risk threshold in these 
circumstances is impossible.254 Indeed, this is precisely the reason we 
allow discretion when setting appropriate risk tolerances for business 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Henning, supra note 155, at 46. Most criminal laws applicable to corporate misconduct require 
“specific intent to commit the crime, a seemingly insurmountable standard of proof for cases related to 
the financial crisis.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 250. Id. at 47. 
 251. Id. at 88–89. 
 252. See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: 
Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1433, 1440 (2010). 
 253. Id. at 1440–41. 
 254. Id. at 1438 (“[T]he concepts of ‘market failure’ and ‘excessive risk’ are both controversial. 
Whether markets fail and why they fail is one issue, and whether there is any such thing as excessive 
risk, and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined, is another issue.”). 
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decisions by applying the highly protective business judgment rule to 
post hoc criticism of management.255 
Imposing criminal liability for recklessness would undoubtedly 
change the calculus to favor loss avoidance over risk, but this is not 
necessarily a good thing. As Henning concluded: 
[L]oss avoidance runs counter to the usual approach to 
corporate decision-making; a certain measure of risk must 
be undertaken to develop a business and generate 
reasonable returns. The only approach virtually guaranteed 
to involve no appreciable risk of loss is doing nothing, but 
that also means there will be little if any return on 
investment.256 
We blame excessive risk-taking where it fails. But this is a 
different kind of blame than that reserved for knowing or intentional 
wrongdoing. In these cases, the perpetrator was, almost invariably, 
trying to function within the law. She was hoping to manage the 
business in such a way as to maximize the return on investment, and 
risks necessarily accompany this effort. Recklessness requires both 
the “subjective element involving the defendant’s awareness of the 
risk stemming from a particular decision, and the objective 
requirement that the conduct be ‘far below’ what a reasonable person 
in a similar position would have done.”257 In many business 
                                                                                                                 
 255. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive 
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981) (“The [business judgment] rule operates to 
bar courts from providing additional, and unnecessary, constraints on management discretion through 
judicial review of operating decisions.”). 
 256. Henning, supra note 155, at 63. 
 257. Id. at 78–79. Here, Henning is describing the recklessness standard established by the British 
Banking Reform Act, which criminalizes recklessness in managing a financial institution. See Banking 
Reform Act (2013) §§ 36(1)(b)–(d) (U.K.). But the standard is familiar as it mirrors the ALI Model 
Penal Code: 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the 
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves 
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decisions, those making the decision are often aware of the risks; the 
subjective element is plainly met. So, the only point of inquiry would 
be whether the risks were unjustifiable; that is, whether the risk was 
of “such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose 
of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that 
a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”258 Too 
often, assessed in the pallid gloom of failure, risks will be difficult to 
justify and easy to condemn. 
None of this suggests we cannot blame the reckless who fail, but 
perhaps we do not condemn them. Condemnation, after all, has long 
been the distinctive function of criminal law.259 In free markets, post 
hoc assessments and bad luck separate those who thrive and profit 
from those who fail.260 Criminalizing reckless or negligent 
management threatens to allow these same factors to distinguish 
those who thrive and profit from those who are imprisoned and 
condemned. Too often the conduct will be the same, and only 
circumstantial consequences will differ. That should not be the 
distinction between success and criminality. 
B.   Corporate Recklessness Is Better Addressed Through Civil 
Liability 
Aside from the mens rea challenge, too many wrongs in the 
corporate context are poorly defined ex ante. This definitional 
challenge results not only from poor legislating, but also from the 
complexity of the economy and the multitude of ways clever actors 
seek an edge.261 As a means of identifying the scope of forbidden 
                                                                                                                 
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person 
would observe in the actor’s situation. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c). 
 258. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c). 
 259. See Hart, supra note 29, at 405. 
 260. Henning, supra note 155, at 63. 
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conduct, the common law is plainly superior to legislation. John 
Hasnas captured this when he wrote, “[W]hen I step back from my 
role as advocate and engage in detached philosophical reflection, I 
am impressed by the subtle sophistication of the common law 
process . . . and find it conceptually superior to the output of the last 
century of criminal legislation.”262 The superiority of common law as 
a mechanism for delineating between legal and illegal conduct is 
plain: it is easier to assess conduct in a particular case than to define 
the forbidden without context. Life is always more complicated and 
nuanced than imagined on the floor of the legislature, and courts 
engage directly with these complexities and nuances when reviewing 
particular cases and controversies.263 
The shortcoming of common law remains that it is inconsistent 
with the legality principle. Criminal law is different: it imposes moral 
condemnation and punishment on plainly forbidden conduct; rules of 
utility and regulation are, or should be, civil.264 To recognize that 
there is a set of problematic conduct that cannot be defined ex ante, 
but must be punished ex post, does not end the inquiry. Our legal 
system has multiple means of imposing punishment, and criminal 
liability is not only the most severe, it is also the type of law subject 
to the legality principle that is, at very least, in tension with what has 
effectively become common law crime. 
Civil liability does not face the same challenges. Prosecutors ought 
to look to civil law in seeking to hold senior personnel 
accountable.265 This is not to suggest criminal liability should be off 
                                                                                                                 
development.”). 
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 263. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
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the table; where a properly defined crime has been violated, and 
where the prosecutor can produce evidence of that violation beyond a 
reasonable doubt, she should bring criminal charges. The problem 
remains that in many instances of corporate malfeasance, the 
substantive law is insufficiently clear or the evidence as to mens rea 
at higher levels of the organization is lacking. In these cases, the 
public will blame senior management, and the public will be angered 
by the absence of accountability. The current trend to push for 
enhanced individual prosecutions is bound to fail; but, the imposition 
of civil liability might accomplish what the criminal law cannot. 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal law is distinctive. Perhaps less so than it once was—by 
way of overuse—but there is a line between criminal and civil 
wrongs. The former contains a moral component—or should contain 
a moral component—not necessary to the latter. To the extent this is 
less true than it could be, we have lost something and gained nothing. 
The continued practice of failing to hold senior management 
accountable for high-profile corporate malfeasance is problematic. It 
sends a dangerous message of tolerance or even affirmance for their 
conduct, and it feeds the narrative that criminal justice applies 
differently to the elite. Yet the call for more individual prosecutions 
is misguided. Whether through the Yates Memo or otherwise, any 
concerted effort to increase the frequency of criminal prosecutions in 
the corporate context will be borne largely by relatively low-level 
personnel. In this way, these initiatives will do nothing to address the 
expressive harm they are designed to counter. Worse, too many of 
these prosecutions will be in tension with the rule of law and basic 
principles of legality. Prosecutors have strong incentives to prosecute 
these cases where they can; if they are not prosecuting these cases, it 
is generally because the cases are weak or non-existent. 
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One solution would be to change the substantive criminal law to 
capture more conduct with lower mens rea requirements. This would 
broaden the criminal law well beyond its traditional contours. 
Expanding criminal liability to people who lack mens rea dilutes its 
moral core and achieves nothing that could not more readily, and less 
problematically, be achieved through civil accountability. 
Much of what angers the public about corporate malfeasance is the 
accountability gap. People blame management that takes on too much 
risk, when the risk is borne almost entirely by the public or by 
shareholders.266 Risky drilling operations might improve profits, 
helping share price as well as the longevity and pay of senior 
management. They might also harm the environment, possibly in a 
catastrophic way. The problem is that the latter costs are borne 
disproportionately by the environment, the public, and shareholders; 
very little of this cost is borne by senior management. Management is 
playing with house money, and the accountability gap exacerbates 
that fact. 
Public blame of management in many of these cases essentially 
means blaming them for behavior that created an unjustifiable risk. If 
the risk was foreseen and ignored, management appears reckless. If 
the risk was unforeseen, but should have been foreseen, management 
appears negligent. Both recklessness and negligence are 
blameworthy, but they are not blameworthy in the way we condemn 
those who intentionally violate a known legal prohibition. This lesser 
type of blame should be accounted for, but civil—not criminal—
sanctions represent the best fit. 
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